

**CHAPTER ONE**

**FRAMING PLEASURE AND POWER IN DETECTIVE  
FICTION**

Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can only develop outside its injunctions, its demands, and its interests. Perhaps, we should abandon the belief that power makes people mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit, rather, that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

Michel Foucault – *Discipline and Punish*

There is no doubt that the resistance of the conscious and preconscious ego subserves the pleasure-principal; it is trying to avoid the pain that would be aroused by the release of the repressed material and our efforts are directed to effecting an entry for such painful feeling by an appeal to the reality-principle.

Sigmund Freud – *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*

## I

The aim of this chapter is to map the relationship between pleasure and power in detective fiction, and show how they function within the narrative space. Their narrative relationship—seen as complicit, contestatory or contrapuntal—translates into an ideologically layered relationship suggesting reflection, resistance and subversion. The chapter deals with the dynamics of social relations that link individual pursuits of pleasure—realization of desires—with social conditioning.

The chapter begins with the following hypotheses:

- (a) that “pleasure” in detective fiction is integral to the process of understanding conflicts within the text, which may involve the nexus between power structures in the “social” and “criminal” world;

(b) that the “pleasure principle” is a necessary premise connective with the latent hermeneutics of power, and required for critical enquiry into the narrative itself.

The relationship between pleasure and power is seen as the determining factor for expressing and realizing individual needs and desires while reading detective texts. It is closely intertwined with the understanding of power mechanics as strategies to govern, rule and regulate a disciplined society. Without such regulations, societies otherwise may give rise to resistance and recalcitrance as avenues for alternative or oppositional power structures.

This chapter contends that in detective fiction the larger design and intention of the narrative is to transcend the given relationship between pleasure and power—and establish an extra-textual relationship between them—that transcodes the text beyond its formal closure. Every detective text examined here problematizes the production and circulation of narrative pleasure through the politics of power.

Pleasure may be explained by Freud’s reference to the relation between pleasure-ego and reality-ego in connection to an individual’s (reader’s) repressed fundamental desires. Raymond Williams illustrates individuals as congenial member, subject, and exile or vagrant, which may be considered in relation to the reader’s position while interpreting the narratives. This chapter forms linkages of narrative pleasure in detective fiction to the mechanics of power. The desire to govern, rule and regulate a disciplined society is a state of pleasure; but resistance and recalcitrance to alternative or oppositional power structures also indicates the pleasure of defiance.

### **1.1.1 Review of Literature**

The methodology that this chapter adopts is interdisciplinary and syncretic. Therefore, how pleasure in detective fiction is already conditioned by a dynamics of social relations and power linkages is explained through Michel Foucault’s model. To this end, the chapter draws from a cluster of Foucault’s work such as *The Birth of the Clinic* (1973), *Discipline and Punish* (1977), *The Foucault Reader* (1984), and *Madness and Civilization* (1988). How state power operates as an instrument for normativization and legitimating its authority and totalitarian strategy or tactics have been explained by Louis Althusser’s definition of ideology as the coercive forces or ideas of the ruling class or the

dominant class, and Antonio Gramsci's concept of ruling hegemonic apparatus and its relations to the subaltern classes. The dynamics of power have also been explained following Frantz Fanon's works, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963). In these works, the ideological suppression through the power of mind over mind has been observed. Fanon also explains the fact that wherever there is power, there is resistance. In this sense, pleasure principle is established as political pleasure negotiating between the power of the social and anti-social world, and also between social conformity and resistance/subversion.

### 1.1.2 Reviewing Pleasure

Studies in Pleasure have been focused upon five major theorists:

- (i) Sigmund Freud (1856-1939);
- (ii) Jaques Lacan (1901-1981);
- (iii) John Berger (1926- );
- (iv) Laura Mulvey (1941- );
- (v) Slavoj Zizek (1949- )

Freud in his work *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), revises his earlier theory of instincts, positing that in addition to the libido, there exists a competing death instinct. He addresses the concept of the pleasure principle as an instinctual drive towards experiencing pleasure, with the idea that it is the dominant mental drive. But due to the pressure of various other instincts, the general tendency towards the experience of pleasure is often in conflict with other drives. One such drive is the reality principle functioning (Ego). Freud uses the word ego in his revised works as a set of psychic function such as judgment, tolerance, reality testing, control, planning, synthesis of information, intellectual functioning etc. Similarly, Freud also terms the super-ego as the internalization of cultural rules. It is a symbolic internalization of the father figure and cultural regulations. Thus, the Ego and the Super-Ego regulate the pleasure instincts, drives and fantasies. It has been observed that this Freudian theory of the Pleasure Principle and its regulation is functional in any given society where established norms control and monitor the instinctive behavior of individuals. Moreover, individuals internalize these regulations from a very early age.

Lacan takes Freud's work forward with his concepts of desire, and jouissance. He uses it for the first time in his Seminar (1953-54) in relation to Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave. Here Lacan equates Jouissance with pleasure, emphasizing the relation between pleasure (Jouissance) and labour. He explains that a law is imposed upon the

slave that he should satisfy the desire and pleasure (Jouissance) of the other. After 1958, Lacan begins to distinguish between pleasure and Jouissance, where he discusses Jouissance as an ethical stance in relation to Kant and Sade. In this phase of his work, jouissance comes to figure as that which Freud referred to as “beyond the pleasure principle”.

John Berger’s essay “Ways of Seeing” (1972), is also very important from the point of understanding the term pleasure. He discusses how the representation of men and women in visual culture entice different gazes, and that men have the legitimate right or power to examine women. In this connection, Berger discusses the pleasure of gazing through the nude depictions of women in European artistic tradition. He explains that the depiction of Eve’s consciousness of her nakedness in the Garden of Eden is a result of how men and women looked at each other in different ways, and the subsequent subordination of women to men’s rule.

Laura Mulvey also deals with pleasure in her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975), using psychoanalytic theory to explain how the power of the patriarchal subconscious influences our film watching and cinema itself. According to Mulvey, cinematic texts correspond to the cultural subconscious which is essentially patriarchal. Mulvey’s work combines semiotic methodology of cinematic means of expression with psychoanalytic analysis of desire structures and the formation of subjectivity. The essays mainly emphasize on how pleasure is provided to the visual experience of men through the power of the cultural subconscious. The gaze of the narrative film structure is necessarily male. The woman is never the bearer of the reifying gaze, but the object of it.

Slavoj Žižek in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989), and in his numerous essays redefines Lacan’s theory on Jouissance by explaining the dialectic between Lack and Excess. The gap between the two is termed by Lacan as The Real. Žižek argues that The Real, however, operates not only as lack, but also as excess because lack is itself repressed. As a result of that repression, the subject is caught in a condition of seeking to regain the absent, but impossible fullness. This state has been termed as Jouissance by Lacan. Though Jouissance has been translated in English as enjoyment, it is not simply enjoyment or pleasure, rather is excessive pleasure that involves elements of transgression, sexuality and suffering. Žižek explains that the notion of pure Jouissance is a fantasy creation: it is an imagined state and impossible to attain. The subject still

holds onto the possibility of such a state, although it is a failure. Conversely, Žižek believes that this failure creates the only true *Jouissance* for the subject, surplus *Jouissance*. Thus, according to Žižek, there is no *jouissance* for the subject but surplus *Jouissance*.

Critical studies on pleasure in detective fiction are negligible, though the term pleasure has been used in the titles. Most of the works have focused on the history of detective fiction, its changing attitude and perspectives. Significant work has been done by Dennis Porter who focuses on ideology, pleasure and narrative study.

Howard Haycraft's *Murder for Pleasure: Life and Times of the Detective* written in 1941, looks at detective fiction as a literary form. Erik Routley's *The Puritan Pleasures of the Detective Story* (1972), makes a historical survey of detective fiction. Routley relates the form to the Puritanical temper of the British and shows how the genre has responded to critique and protect this spirit. Dennis Porter's *The Pursuit of Crime: Art and Ideology in Detective Fiction* (1981), shows how detective fiction makes use of standard literary devices to fulfil the dual mission of forwarding action while prolonging suspense. This book makes use of several poststructuralist ideas and terms to show the convergence between modes of interpretation and modes of narrative presentation of intention and method in detective fiction. Porter argues that narrative pleasure cannot be separated from the narrative process, and that pleasure and ideology intersect in the narrative at chosen points.

### 1.1.3. Reviewing Power

Studies in power have been focused upon five major theorists:

- (i) Karl Marx (1818-1883); (ii) Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937); (iii) Louis Althusser (1918-1990); (iv) Michel Foucault (1926-1984); (iii) Slavoj Žižek (1949- )

Marx's most important works include *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), and *Das Kapital* (1867-1894). Through these works he explains that the economic situation and the form of the productive system is the most important determinant of all other aspects of the society. Social institutions and ideas, such as the system of law, of morality and education are significant elements within the "superstructure" of society. Marx argues

that dominant ideas are the result of material or economic conditions and therefore in a capitalist society, capitalists own and control the productive resources (i.e., capital), and workers own only their labour. Therefore, according to Marx, in any historical period, dominant and subservient classes can be identified and this leads to his fundamental concern about the inequality in wealth and power. Marx's concept of power is based on the disproportionate share of society's wealth and privileges. Marx says that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles and that the state serves the dominant classes in society. In a capitalist society the state primarily rules in the interest of the capitalist class. In this connection, Marx explains that dominated and exploited classes do not understand their situation or their interests and this is the result of a dominant ideology. Thus, in any society power rests with the dominant class due to the dominant ideology. Marx refers to this dominant ideology as power which is made up of ideas suiting the dominant class.

One of Gramsci's ideas in his *Prison Notebooks* (1971), was the concept of "hegemony," or ideological domination. When one ideology, or world view, dominates, it suppresses other ways of explaining reality. Gramsci explains that a dominant ideology consists of a culture's way of seeing and believing, and the institutions that uphold these beliefs are religion, education, family, and the media. Through these beliefs and institutions, society endorses the ethical beliefs and manners of the ruling culture. The institutions and beliefs that the dominant culture supports are so powerful that alternative ways of envisioning reality are very hard to imagine. This is how hegemony is created and maintained. According to Gramsci, hegemony locks up a society even more tightly because of the way ideas are transmitted by language. The words we use to speak and write have been constructed by social interactions through history and shaped by the dominant ideology of the times. Thus they are loaded with cultural meanings that condition us to think in particular ways, and to not be able to think very well in other ways. Gramsci's concept hegemony, in other words, is about power because it is about serving the dominant ideology. He also talks about domination by consent where the dominant culture conditions people's minds very early in their lives. He points that people have been conditioned by the language to think—and feel about that thinking—in ways that serve the dominant ideology. Thus, the dominant culture exerts its power by brainwashing the society.

Althusser (1918-1990), in his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1971), reiterates the Marxist theory that in order to exist, a social formation is required to essentially, continuously and perpetually reproduce the productive forces (labour-power), the conditions of production and the relations of production. He talks about the State Apparatuses which are insidious machinations controlled by the capitalist ruling ideology in the context of a class struggle to subjugate the ruled class. Althusser builds his concept of the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) on the Marxist spatial metaphor of the edifice describing a social formation constituted by the foundational infrastructure, i.e. the economic base, on which stands the superstructure consisting of the Law—the State (politico-legal) and Ideology. Althusser extends this paradigm by scrutinizing this structural metaphor and discussing the superstructure in detail. He also indirectly refers to power when he regards the State as a repressive apparatus which is used by the ruling class as a mechanics to suppress and dominate the working class. According to him, the basic function of the Repressive State Apparatus (Heads of State, government, police, courts, army etc.) is to intervene and act in favour of the ruling class by repressing the ruled class by violent and coercive means. Thus, the RSA serves the ruling class, as most often the ruling class possesses State power.

Michel Foucault's (1926-1984), understanding of power changes between his early work on institutions (*Madness and Civilization*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, *Discipline and Punish*) and his later work on sexuality and governmentality. In the early work, Foucault explains that power somehow inheres in institutions themselves rather than in the individuals that make those institutions function. Foucault explores in those books the creation of modern disciplines, with their principles of order and control, which tends to disindividualize power. This makes it seem as if power inheres in the prison, the school, the factory etc. The Panopticon becomes Foucault's model for the way other institution function: the Panopticon “is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up. The idea of discipline surfaces from the concept of the Panopticon. The idea of discipline itself functions as an abstraction of the idea of power from any individual. The effect of this tendency to disindividualize power is the perception that power resides in the machine itself (the “panoptic machine”); the



“technology” of power) rather than in its operator. Foucault in his later work explains that power ultimately inheres in individuals, including those that are surveilled or punished. He explains in “The Subject and Power,” “something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action.”

Slavoj Žižek (1949- ), in most of his works deals with power through his discussion on the concept of ideology. His work is a continuing defense and use of the term “ideology”. According to the classical Marxist definition, ideologies are discourses that promote false ideas (or “false consciousness”) in subjects about the political regimes they live in. Žižek proposes that in order to understand today’s politics we need a different notion of ideology. In a typically bold reversal, Žižek’s position is that today’s widespread consensus that our world is postideological gives voice to what he calls the “archideological” fantasy. He explains that if the term “ideology” has any meaning at all, ideological positions are always what people impute to Others (for today’s left, for example, the political right are the dupes of one or another noble lie about natural community; for the right, the left are the dupes of well meaning but utopian egalitarianism bound to lead to economic and moral collapse, etc.). Žižek argues that ideologies are always presented by their proponents as being discourses about things too sacred to profane by politics. Hence, Žižek in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (2010), is to claim that today ideology has not so much disappeared from the political landscape as come into its own. It is exactly because of this success, Žižek argues, that ideology has also been able to be dismissed in accepted political and theoretical opinion. He contests Althusser’s understanding of ideological identification that an individual is wholly “interpellated” into a place within a political system by the system’s dominant ideology and ideological state apparatuses by drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Žižek borrows the term *Jouissance* from Lacanian psychoanalysis and links it to power through the subjection to political ideology. In this, he agrees with Althusser’s notion of “materiality” of ideology and its embodiment in institutions and peoples’ everyday practices and lives. Žižek says that very often cultural practices of communities involve inherent transgression. By this he means that these practices are intentionally sanctioned for the subjects with the purpose of getting them closer to the regime’s master signifiers like “nation”, “God” and “our way of life” etc. *Jouissance* in French is enjoyment, while

in English it is translated as pleasure which is always understood as transgressive pleasure. Žižek argues that subjects' experiences of the events and practices wherein their political culture organises its specific relations to *jouissance* (for example specific sports, types of alcohol or drugs, music, festivals, films) as ostensibly non-political is actually preparing for the deeper truth unknowingly. In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Žižek cites Blaise Pascal's advice that doubting subjects should get down on their knees and pray, and then they will believe. This is how political consensus is formed. His views on power are reflected through the observation that the success of political ideologies depends on sublime objects posited by political ideologies. These sublime objects are what political subjects take it as their regime's ideologies' central words like God and the King, in whose name they will (if necessary) transgress ordinary moral laws and lay down their lives. Thus Žižek argues that ideology exerts power over subjects by providing them with a way of seeing the world according to the political perspectives of the regime.

Critical studies in power in Detective fiction have been dealt with by Jon Thompson (1993), Peter Thom (1998), and Nels Pearson and Marc Singer (2013).

In Jon Thompson's work *Fiction, Crime, and Empire: Clues to Modernity and Postmodernism* (1993), the modern detective story is generally recognized as a creation of the mid-nineteenth century, coincident with the development of the modern police force, the rise of the modern metropolis, and the creation of the modern bureaucratic state. Jon Thompson presents detective fiction—from Poe to the present—in political terms, as an expression of cultural hegemony directed against a suspect and subversive other who threatens (either from within or without) the dominance of an imperial culture. He reads detective stories as “intrinsically” modernist because they offer myths of the experience of modernity, of what it is like to live in a world dominated by the contradictory forces of renewal and disintegration, progress and destruction, possibility and impossibility. For Thompson the experience of modernist displacement and reconstruction has been primarily shaped in England and America by the tensions implicit in “the imperial enterprise” and the “dynamic energies of capitalism”. He construes modernism as the institutionally and culturally dominant field of literary practices containing residual (realist) as well as emergent (postmodern) elements, a field he finds particularly fertile for the development of a genre of contested literary value like

detective fiction. As his title suggests, Thompson's critique of modernism is firmly grounded in ideology, informed by Marxist and Foucauldian thought with more specific debts to figures like Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, and Fredric Jameson. For Thompson, modernism is the product of late capitalism, and detective fiction—itsself conquering and colonizing a "residual" evaluative realism—is its essential literary form.

Peter Thoms in his work *Detection and its Design: Narrative and Power in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Detective Fiction* (1998), discusses on narrative power. Though detective fiction is usually thought of as genre fiction having a common formula, Peter Thoms argues in his investigation of some of the most important texts in the development of detective fiction in the nineteenth century that the very works that establish the genre's formulaic structure also subvert that structure. This work treats early detective fiction as a self-conscious form that is suspicious of the detective it ostensibly celebrates, and critical of the authorial power he wields in attempting to reconstruct the past and script a narrative of the crime. In readings of Godwin's *Caleb Williams*, Poe's Dupin stories, Dickens's *Bleak House*, Collins's *The Moonstone*, and Doyle's *The Hound of the Baskervilles*, Thoms argues that the detective's figurative writing emerges out of a desire for power. This work demonstrates that, far from being a naïve form, early detective fiction grapples with the medium of storytelling itself. To pursue these inward-turning fictions is to uncover the detective's motives of controlling the representation of both himself and others, a discovery that in turn significantly undermines the authority of his solutions.

*Detective Fiction in a Postcolonial and Transnational World* (2013), edited by Nels Pearson and Marc Singer takes up a neglected area in the study of the crime novel. This collection investigates the growing number of writers who adapt conventions of detective fiction to expose problems of law, ethics, and truth that arise in postcolonial and transnational communities. While detective fiction has been linked to imperialism and constructions of race from its earliest origins, recent developments signal the evolution of the genre into a potent framework for narrating the complexities of identity, citizenship, and justice in a postcolonial world. The book initiates what could be a productive line of critical enquiry in detective fiction studies. This dissertation has used some of the postcolonial concerns raised in this book.

Pleasure has been variously defined as desire, fancy, indulgence etc. The will or desire of someone or some agency in power is also interpreted as pleasure. If this definition is considered then the concept of pleasure and power is interconnected and originates from the understanding of “ideology.” An image or representation of anything formed in the mind as unconscious illusion is fantasy which may be seen as unconscious ideology. This unconscious ideology may generate pleasure in the following and obeying of the power of state machinery. In this context, too much reverence for a given power structure indicates fetishism. Pleasure therefore is an unconscious fantasy which structures our social reality, i.e., the subjective state of belief. It is ideological because subjects or individuals are guided by an illusion which can be interpreted according to the Marxian formula—“they do not know it, but they are doing it” (Zizek 32). In other words, “And even if they know it, they still do it,” because “the distorting spectacles of ideology” (Zizek 28) nurturing the fetishist illusion (producing pleasure) motivates their beliefs and action.

Lacan regards desire as an unconscious process and is uncovered only when it is spoken in the presence of the other. Desire can never be fully explained, and if it is done, there is always a surplus or leftover. He also explains need and demand in relation to desire. According to Lacan, need is a biological instinct where the subject depends on the other to satisfy its own needs. In order to get the other’s help, need must be articulated into demand. The presence of the other ensures the satisfaction of the other as well as represents the other’s love. In this context, desire therefore is need subtracted from demand. Desire therefore is the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand. Desire can never be fully satisfied: Lacan also distinguishes between desire and drive. Desire is one but drives are many. In this connection, Lacan’s term *Jouissance* is also important. Lacan refers to *Jouissance* as suffering and relates it to Kant’s example of the man who refuses a night of pleasure with a woman if the price to be paid is death. Lacan explains that a man in pursuit of pleasure would refuse it, but one who is in search of *Jouissance* would accept death as the price to be paid for it. Thus, in the acceptance of death as the price, the subject experiences in which pleasure and pain are presented as a single package to take or to leave. Lacan gives his first structural account of *Jouissance*. He posits pleasure as that which sets the limits on *Jouissance*. Moreover, the sacrificing of *Jouissance* becomes a necessary condition for subjectivity—the subject, by submitting

to the symbolic order has to sacrifice some *Jouissance* because it is forbidden and also never attainable.

The operation of *Jouissance* can be understood as a relationship between modalities—an excessive compensation for an originary lack, one which is simultaneously both imaginary and real. The term surplus *Jouissance* has been represented by Žižek as object ‘a’. Object ‘a’ connects the lack of the Real and the excess of *jouissance* because it operates as both the object-cause and the object of desire. Žižek describes Coca-cola as the perfect embodiment of object ‘a’ and as such the ultimate capitalist merchandise. In coke, we have a drink removed of all the objectively necessary properties of a satisfying drink; it provides no nutritional benefit, it does not quench thirst, nor provide the ‘satisfied calm’ of an alcoholic beverage. Instead, all that is left is the mysterious ‘X’, the surplus over enjoyment that is characteristic of the commodity. Žižek connects this to how the dynamic of lack and excess in subjectivity aids our understanding of capitalism. In other words, he explains how capitalism exercises its power over the subject’s desire which can never be satisfied; instead they go on wanting more and more in a never ending process of consumption unconsciously believed to be the path to wholeness. He cites a strong relation between surplus *Jouissance* and the operation of capitalism which is termed as surplus value. Corresponding to the logic of surplus *jouissance*, in Capitalism the production of surplus is only possible because of the existence of lack. This has been illustrated by Žižek with the notion of freedom which operates as a universal principal at the core of liberal democratic—capitalist ideology. In this connection, the freedom to sell one’s labour in the market subverts the notion of freedom itself. Nonetheless, it is important for the continued existence of freedom; without the wage labour system, capitalist freedom would be impossible. When labour becomes a commodity it gets negated in itself. The freedom to sell one’s labour no longer remains a freedom since the worker is exploited while having to sell his labour as a commodity. Thus, this form of surplus value is the existence of exploitation even when the worker is fully paid. This produces a fundamental fissure within surplus value creating a Real affect which Žižek calls class. Therefore, the class created by Capitalism is a lack within the system and also an excess due to the presence of *Jouissance*. In other words, *Jouissance* and Capitalism are directly interrelated.

#### 1.1.4. Pleasure: The Real of our Desire

In his *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Žižek says that pleasure is that which satisfies our desire or what Lacan explains as the “Real” of our desire. On the other hand, power can be considered as ideological fetishism of the ruling class—“as Marx points out, ‘relations of domination and servitude’” (Žižek 26). Power creates an illusion for the subjects – “ideology consists in the very fact that the people ‘do not know what they are really doing,’ that they have a false representation of the social reality to which they belong” (Žižek 31). Žižek explains that “the symbolic order is precisely such a formal order which supplements and/or disrupts the dual relationship of ‘eternal’ factual reality and internal subjective experience” (Žižek 19). The existing social order is the result of the Ideological State Apparatus and the mechanics of internalizing it. Thus, social reality is connected to social ethics and law, and this is further mediated through subjectivity. Therefore, “we must obey [law] not because it is just good or even beneficial, but simply because it is the law...” (Žižek 37). To this end it can be said that authority and the obedience to law is an effect of ideological interpellation. The term “obedience” has an implication in understanding nineteenth century detective texts where the ideology of the narrative functions in conformity with the larger power structures in given societies. It helps in examining how detective fiction is often complicit with established forms of power as well as established notions of crime and disorder in the society of the times. Obedience to the state machinery explains how nineteenth century detective fiction operates in a pleasure-power continuum.

But Žižek also introduces the “hidden other” by discussing Pascal’s view of how the symbolic machine of ideology is internalized, and this process of internalization through structural necessity “never fully succeeds, that there is always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality” (Žižek 43). This “hidden other” therefore can be interpreted as the hidden desire or pleasure which is actually a residue within the ideological interpellation of the symbolic order through the symbolic machine or the “automaton.” Žižek uses the example of the figure of the “Jew” which is symbolical of the undeniable existence of the want for desire and pleasure in the social order. The “Jew” is the impossibility within ideological edifice. In Žižek’s words: “Society is ... prevented by its own antagonist nature, by its own immanent blockage.... In other words, what is excluded from the Symbolic (from the frame of the Corporatist Socio-

symbolic order) returns in the Real as a paranoid construction of the ‘Jew’” (Zizek 127). To this end, it can be suggested that the “Jew” is an embodiment of desire or pleasure which is a social symptom—“the point at which it becomes obvious that society ‘doesn’t work,’ that the social mechanism ‘creaks’.... the ‘Jew appears as an intruder who introduces from outside disorder, decomposition and corruption of the social edifice—whose elimination would enable us to restore order, stability and identity. But ... we must ... identify with the symptoms ... we must recognize in the ‘excesses’ attributed to ‘Jews’ the truth about ourselves” (Zizek 127-28). This “other” which is present in every individual is important in understanding some twentieth century and post-modernist detective texts. It explains how narratives reflect splits within power structures and that the “pleasure” of fiction derives from disruptions in the power structure. In post-modernist detective texts, the narrative acts as a subsumptive agent and engulfs within itself the negotiation of power between the social and the anti-social world, without coming to any kind of reconciliation or resolution. Thus, pleasure and power can sometimes be seen to operate as antithetical sites, while at other times the pleasure-power relationship is primarily subversive.

#### **1.1.5. Ways of Seeing and Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Power**

John Berger’s essay “Ways of Seeing” (1972), analyzes the representation of men and women in visual culture and explains how the perception on women is formed by the pleasure and power of the patriarchal gaze. According to Berger, the cultural significance of a woman is very different from that of a man. A man’s presence in the world is all about his potency, power and ability. But a woman’s representation is not about her potential, rather what cannot be done by her. Thus, the value of a woman’s self is assessed through the manner in which she is portrayed, in her own eyes, in others’ eyes and in men’s eyes. Regarding Renaissance art, Berger notes that the shame of Eve’s nakedness emanates from a third observer and this is retained in later secular art with the woman’s awareness for the fact that she is being gazed at. For Berger, ways of seeing are ways of subjecting, which distinguish a man’s stance in the world from that of a woman. He distinguishes between nakedness and nudity in the European tradition: being naked means just being oneself, but being nude in the artistic sense means being without clothes for the purpose of being gazed at. A naked body must become an object of a gaze in order to become a nude representation. Painting and photographs which portray nudity

appeal to the viewer's sexuality, the male viewer, and have nothing to do with the portrayed woman's sexuality—women are there for men to look at, not for themselves, for man's sexuality, not their own. Thus, Berger argues that the pleasure of gazing indicates the unequal relation between men and women: it is a kind of power which is deeply assimilated in our cultures and objectifies women.

In this connection, Laura Mulvey also argues in her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975), about the popularity of the Hollywood films and states that it is determined by pre existing social patterns which have shaped the fascinated subject. Mulvey identifies two manners in which Hollywood cinema produces pleasure, manners which arise from different mental mechanisms. The first involves the objectification of the image, and the second one the identification with it. Both mechanisms represent the mental desires of the male subject. The first form of pleasure relates to what Freud termed as scopophilia or the pleasure derived from subjecting someone to one's gaze. The second form of pleasure which operates alongside the scopophilia is the identification with the represented character which is brought about by needs stemming from the Freudian Ego. Mulvey says that scopophilia in films circulates pleasure with the man always on the active gazing side and the woman on the passive “to-be-looked-at-ness” side. The films that Mulvey survey revolve around a dominant male figure and a demystified female figure. Her mysteries are dismantled and she is either punished or saved by the male figure. According to Mulvey, the cinematic female figure is a paradoxical one; she is attractive therefore incites deep fears of castration in the male (fear of losing power over the female). Therefore, the male subconscious escapes this fear of castration and exercises power by fetishizing her thereby labeling her as the provider for the needs of the masculine form of desire. Thus, it can be seen that pleasure in narrative cinema is a corollary of the power of the socially predetermined male gaze.

#### **1.1.6. Detective Fiction as Ideological Apparatus**

Detective fiction can be analyzed as a genre that reflects the various power structures of society, the texts being ideological apparatuses. Given that the definition of “pleasure” in detective fiction derives from its status as “genre fiction,” it follows that there is possibility of analyzing and making a political interpretation of pleasure by following the design and intention of the narrative as a process of opening up issues of state authority



and power. This can be defined by what Fredric Jameson's reference to the term "mediation" in his work *The Political Unconscious* (1981). According to him mediation is "the relationship between the levels of instances, and the possibility of adapting analyses and findings from one level to another. Mediation is the classical dialectical term for the establishment of relationships between the internal dynamics of the political state and its economic base" (Jameson 39). In this sense, narrative pleasure in detective fiction can be seen as tools of mediation between state power and its social, political and juridical ideological reflections.

The term "pleasure" is usually associated with ideas of transgression, non-sanctioned desires, and anything that is unofficial and forbidden. This brings into focus the term "repression" which in other words is affirmation or assertion of authority and the structures of power. The fact that political, religious, ethical, and aesthetic consciousness or "Ideology" is created by the superstructure also points that it is a means of legitimating the power of the ruling class in a given society. The state as a hegemonic apparatus pre-conditions the subjects' existence as social beings, and they can exercise their needs and desires within legitimate boundaries. In order to enhance its power the state also politically manipulates the reflections of the subjects' rational faculty. In other words, the power structures of the state hold the reins of the autonomous but actually illusory happiness and pleasure of its subjects. Crime is homologous with transgression, but it is seen that these two homologues are not always monitored through direct repression. The state apparatus employs various disciplinary techniques that do not threaten or challenge the fundamental pleasure-ego of human beings. Therefore, the state creates illusions of freedom and free subjects by sometimes stretching parameters and sometimes by creating delusional reality of pleasure. It is interesting to see in Mikhail Bakhtin's *Rabelais and his World* (1965), how authority often withholds power and temporarily grants the license for the "unofficial." It creates an illusion of the destruction of authority and official culture. Through this surreal pleasure of legalizing the illegal, the state can be seen to operate as a comprehensive surveilling apparatus, and as a means of extending its subterranean or all-pervasive power.

In this context, the freedom connected with the profane language of the marketplace functional in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the excesses of the Carnavalesque culture and the sanctioned obscenity of the material bodily lower stratum point the

defense mechanism of the state by keeping its subjects happy. Thus, it renews and re-establishes its power through these illusory autonomous processes of circulation of pleasure. Bakhtin describes:

The marketplace of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance was a world in itself ... from loud cursing to the organized show ... were imbued with the same atmosphere of freedom, frankness, and familiarity.... The marketplace was the center of all that is unofficial; it enjoyed a certain extra territoriality in a world of official order and official ideology.... (Bakhtin 153-54)

In this sense, when Bakhtin refers to the two month long fairs and carnivals at Lyon, it is implied that Lyon also had a ten month long official order of “hierarchy and etiquette” (Bakhtin 154). Therefore, this assurance of this unofficial spirit is also a confirmation of the return to the social order which is strictly guarded by the authoritarian power. Moreover, the uncrowning of the old king and crowning of the new king is not only symbolic of death and rebirth, but can be looked at as the continuation of the cycle of power and authority for reorganizing border after chaos.

#### **1.1.7. Detective Fiction, Individual and Society**

Power is evident in all aspects of social relations. The execution of power as well as its defiance is a form of human pleasure considering the bipolarity of state repressive measures or social control and the fundamental human desire of recalcitrance. Narratives of crime and detection often foreground authoritative power that is licensed to surveil corruption and any tendency of social deviance within the corpus in tandem with the state apparatus. Power in some detective texts can be seen as a means of preservation of the regulatory codes of a disciplined society. While in some other texts, power functions as anti-state machinery challenging or subsuming the power structures of society. In this sense, Pleasure could be explained as the desire to interpret what is “legitimate” and what is “non-sanctioned” in the social body of the narrative irrespective of the regulatory codes. These terms are not fixed and the cross-over between the subversive world and the repressive social world in the reader’s psyche cannot be demarcated. Sometimes compliance with the juridical scheme of a narrative may not be desired; while in other cases, the restoring of law and order may be established. To this extent, pleasure alternates between the desire for social deviance and the acceptance of the repressive

codes of the society. In other words, pleasure in detective fiction circulates with the narrative interpretation of power.

While analyzing detective fiction, the need to understand the relationship between the “individual” and “society” is important. Specifically, in trying to define the individual’s role in understanding detective fiction, it is the “narrative intention” (Brooks, *Reading* 9), of the text that explains how social conformity or non-conformity through the narrative is achieved. This is understood by Raymond Williams’ representation of the individual in his essay “Individuals and Societies” (see Higgins, *Reader*), either as “congenial member,” “subject,” or “exile/vagrant” in his attitude and behaviour towards the society. Keeping this in view, it is suggested that the narrative of a detective text could be interpreted in light of this relationship between the individual and society. However, when Williams describes: “... the total reality of an individual’s relations to society is often a compound of the particular kinds of organization described” (Higgins 81), he means that an individual’s relationship to his society can be that of a member, subject, exile and vagrant happening together in his lifetime, but at different stages of his growth. That an individual’s relationship with society can be a compound of the kinds of organization has been described by Williams. But this happens not necessarily at different stages of growth; rather it could manifest or remain latent in the individual psyche all together at the same time. This can be best understood in connection to the psyche involved while reading detective fiction. In this sense, forms of power and social authority foregrounded by the narrative appeals to some as congenial members, to some as dissatisfied subjects, while to some others as either exiles or vagrants. In this context, it is beneficial to understand the individual’s position in the medieval society and the modern society. Raymond Williams describes in his essay as:

“Individual” meant “inseparable,” in medieval thinking, and its main use was in the context of theological argument about the nature of the Holy Trinity. The effort was to explain how a being could be thought of as existing in his own nature yet existing by his nature as part of an indivisible whole. ... and “individual” became a term used to indicate a member of some group, kind, or species. (Higgins 66)

Williams here emphasizes on the individual’s role in medieval societies as part of an indivisible whole.

He further describes:

As mobility increased, and at least some men could change their status, the idea of being an individual in a sense separable from one's social role obviously gained in strength, the growth of capitalism, and the great social changes associated with it, encouraged certain men to see "the individual" as a source of economic ability, by his free enterprise. (Higgins 67)

In modern societies, the individual becomes individualistic in the true sense of the term, cut off, and living for a separate existence from the indivisible whole.

To this extent in the modern times, the identity of the "individual" has been separated from being a part of an indivisible whole. Other than from functioning solely for the group, community etc., the individual now has learnt to exist for his/her "individual existence as a thing separable from ... a social function, a social rank" (Higgins 68). Unlike the medieval times, the individual ideology is not always compliant with the social ideology. Moreover, the individual needs and desires might not be permitted or satiated by the society and its ideals. In order to submit to its values which Matthew Arnold calls "our best self" (see Higgins 69), the social machinery exercises its restraining codes and conducts in order to train and control individual wants. This needs to be understood with the purpose for defining an individual's ambiguous relationship with society. This ambiguity can further be related to the understanding of detective fiction where the circulation of pleasure in the narrative is not always socially/morally sanctioned. Rather, it presents antagonism between individual and society, and pleasures which the social machinery need to repress and restrict. Detective fiction studies "the conflicting needs" (Higgins 70), better defined as the Freudian "pleasure-ego" versus society as a mechanism of restraint and diversion. Raymond Williams describes the formation of the "social character" in the individual as a similar process of the anthropological concept of a "pattern of culture":

Comparative studies of different societies have added to our historical evidence to show how various are the learned system of behaviour and attitudes which groups of human beings adopt. Each of these systems, while it lasts, is the form of a society, a pattern of culture to which most of its individual members are successfully trained. (Higgins 72)

Williams defines the meaning of social character as a shaping process and a selective response to experience. It is also a learned system of feeling and acting which is congenial to society. According to Williams, only some individuals become congenial members of the society, while there are others who do not conform or undergo suppression of their desires. But a watertight segregation of categories of individuals as conformists and non-conformists would be similar to categorizing individuals as either totally good or totally bad. An individual's social character is the tip of the iceberg, and the dormant and repressed innate desires are trained and tamed to meet social necessities.

Raymond Williams labels individuals reflecting servility as "responsible" and "law-abiding," and individuals reflecting lawlessness and eccentricity as "independent" and "free spirit." It can be argued that these contrasting and contradictory traits may be present wholly in an individual. While society channelizes, refines and restrains the antisocial traits in the individual and converts him into a congenial member of the society, at the same time these traits are not completely abandoned or expunged from the individual psyche. Rather, these remain in the unconscious psyche and in certain situations and particular environment can resurface into the conscious psyche of an individual. Raymond Williams uses terms such as subject and servant for individuals who "acquiesce in a way of living which in fact fails to correspond with or satisfy his own personal organization [and] will obey authorities he does not personally accept, carry out social functions that have no personal meaning to him, [and] even feel and think in ways so foreign to his actual desires ..." (Higgins 77). This trait may be latently present in every rational individual.

Similarly Williams' terms used to label individuals as "rebel", "exile" and "vagrant" are also true for all individuals who are rational and congenial members of the society. He describes the "rebel" as: "The ways of his society are not his ways, but in rebelling against one social form he is seeking to establish another" (Higgins 78). Regarding the "exile" he says: "Often he is like the subject in that unless he conforms he will be destroyed or will be unable to maintain his life. But he is unlike the subject in that he has managed to escape, or has allowed to get away" (Higgins 79). The "vagrant" according to Williams "stays in his own society, though he finds its purposes meaningless and its values irrelevant.... There is nothing in particular that the vagrant wants to happen; his maximum demand is that he should be left alone.... He will do anything that is necessary

to survive within this, but this activity will have neither personal nor social meaning; it is merely a temporary way of keeping alive, or ‘getting by’” (Higgins 80).

### **1.1.8. Individual and the Unconscious**

Since a reader is also an individual of the society and despite being congenial members can retain all the antisocial sentiments described above in the unconscious mind. These sentiments may never be expressed publicly, but these can resurface to the conscious psyche through some other means. Referring to Freud’s work in *The Unconscious* (2005), these antisocial feelings of the reader (individual) can be seen as human fundamental drives or pleasure-ego that has been suppressed by the codes of society. In this connection, Freud explains that if the pleasure-ego is not satisfied, “unpleasure” (See Freud, *Unconscious*), or repression takes over, disrupting the equilibrium of the psyche. Therefore, to balance the “pleasure-principle,” Freud introduces the term “reality-principle” and describes: “... the reality-ego has no other task than to strive for what is useful and to protect itself from what is harmful. By taking over from the pleasure-principle, the reality-principle is really just safeguarding it, not deposing it” (Freud 6). Further, what Freud writes about the reconciliation of the two principles through Art in *The Unconscious* is true also for fiction where the pleasure-ego is satisfied by framing a real world from the fantasy world, “which are appreciated by people as valid representations of the real world” (Freud 7). A similar dissatisfaction of pleasure-ego due to societal restraints and suppression of the fundamental drives benefits from the construction of characters and a world that resembles reality—an offshoot of the desires of the unconscious mind.

Moreover, Freud discusses the drive stimulus that originates as a “need” from within the individual psyche and requires “satisfaction.” He explains: “The object of a drive is that upon which or through which the drive is able to achieve its aims” (Freud 17). In this sense, detective narratives create a similar drive stimulus experience governed by pleasure principle, and the object of the drive is the narrative satisfaction of pleasure-ego. The individual psyche is therefore controlled through the narrative construction of a world that resembles reality and in turn satisfies the drive ambition. The inner needs of pleasure, that are, one, insatiable, and two, run the risk of producing unpleasure or repression can be fulfilled by reading about such unattainable latent psychic desires.

This can be further elaborated by Freud's pair of opposites "sadism-masochism" in relation to pleasure-ego. Freud's explanation of sadism being the active aim of fundamental drive stimulus turns back on the self and transforms into masochism or the passive aim. Since sadism-masochism is a defense mechanism against the drives, "violence towards or power over another person (the object) is relinquished and replaced by the subject's own person" (Freud 21). In this sense, the reader's pleasure from the antisocial, that is, inflicting pain and violence or exercising power over others (reader's sadistic pleasure) is sometimes fulfilled through fictions dealing with crime. This drive then turns back to an individual's own self where he experiences this same pain, violence and power inflicted on him through reality of the narrative world. This masochistic pleasure that detective fiction provides is a means of sublimating a human being's fundamental antisocial drives.

That detective fiction produces pleasure through its suspense, thrill and the teleological revelation is a very limited view. The "pleasure principle" of reading the text shifts from its putative function to the level of "political pleasure" by demystifying the mechanics of power. The desire to participate and negotiate in the power struggle between the social world and the antisocial world determines narrative pleasure in this genre. To this end, pleasure is conditioned more by a socio-psychological need. It is an involvement in the nexus of power between authority and criminal, rather than a requirement of the plot. In other words, the narrative as an ideological apparatus provides interpretation of the problematic relation between the "ideal/social" versus the "penal." The marginal line that separates these two constructs is examined by the narrative and redefines the "social" and the "penal" according to ideological standpoints. The narrative assessment of the dynamics of social relations and power linkages that are in concurrence with psychological desires (interpreted as what Freud refers to as the pleasure-principle) and sociological desires (what Raymond Williams defines as the relationship between individual and society) produces pleasure.

### **1.1.9 Power: The Mind and Body**

Power is a dominating force sometimes latent and sometimes overt, existing in all kinds of relationships, associations, interactions and communications in a given society. In a social situation human beings exhibit the urge to exercise authority, govern, rule and subjugate others. This very mechanics of power is evident in the state power structures

and its interventions in surveillance and social control. In other words, a society, whether primitive, medieval or modern, thrives by making a distinction between authority and the Subject. The exercise of power seems to have changed from the middle ages to the present times where the focus has shifted from body to mind. In consequence, the method of an extremely direct and publicized corporal punishment of the offender has transformed into a very subtle technique of handling and circulating state power in surveilling and penalizing social offenders. Behind the apparent veneer of dealing with subjects on the psychological level, the motive of state power still remains totalitarian and sovereign.

Althusser in his discussion of the “Repressive State Apparatuses” and the “Ideological State Apparatuses,” he suggests that both RSAs and ISAs work together to maintain order on behalf of state authority. Since society voices the ideology of the ruling class/dominant class, ISAs like religious, educational, social, political institutions etc., together function to carry out the objectives of the state apparatus. So literature and arts, to a large extent are influenced by the politics of power. Foucault echoes Althusser when he speaks of power at the centre of seemingly altruistic programmes that, in reality, form part of a disciplinary mechanism. This involves, on the one hand, Bentham’s Panopticon, and on the other, social formations like the churches, schools, hospitals, asylums etc. Barry Smart explains the Panopticon as a means of enforcing power in his work *Michel Foucault* (2007):

Bentham’s conception of the Panopticon ... “produces homogeneous effects of power” as an “architectural figure,” and as a “laboratory,” ... given that those illuminated by power were unable to see their observer(s) the latter condition, a consciousness of being in a visible space, of being watched, effectively ensured an automatic functioning of power. (Smart 88)

Further, the schools and health clinics were a means of seeping into the social body for monitoring the mass for disciplinary measures. In the words of Smart: “The concept of the disciplinary society refers not to the realization of a programme for a disciplined and orderly society but to the diffusion of disciplinary mechanisms throughout the social body, to the process by which the disciplines eventually constituted a general formula of domination” (Smart 91).



To this extent the “Panopticon effect” is deeply entrenched in the subject’s minds manifested by conscious or unconscious realization and acknowledgement of the presence of social surveillance and authority in every aspect of society. In other words the subject’s apparent freedom is an illusion, and in reality they are always harnessed by state power. This idea is elaborated by Terry Eagleton in his work *Marxism and Literary Criticism* (1976), where he says that in person’s consciousness (social, political, intellectual) is formed by his/her material conditions. In fact, these conditions are often a mechanism of the state to exert its power over its subjects. In every period and every society, Marxist theory seeks to show how a society’s economic base or “infrastructure” is responsible for creating the “superstructure.” As Eagleton puts it: “certain forms of law and politics, a certain kind of state, whose essential function is to legitimate the power of the social class which own the means of economic production” (*Marxism* 5). To extend it further, the class that controls economic production also holds the reins of authority and power. However, social control more often is manipulated through interpellations as ideologically manipulated artistic structures.

Foucault defines power in his work *Discipline and Punish* (1977), by trying to explain the relation between those that are empowered to punish and those that are pronounced as social deviants. Though the state claims that penalty does not imply the desire to punish, rather “they are intended to correct, reclaim, ‘cure’; a technique of improvement represses ... the strict expiation of evil-doing,” but “those who carry out the penalty tend to become an autonomous sector” (*Discipline* 10). In other words, the punitive measures adopted by the state is a direct means of extending power over individuals specifically, and the society in broad-spectrum, without the need to clarify or justify its administrative responsibilities. Foucault in most of his works perceives power as an imperative social/political mechanics or tactics of domination which has changed only in its form and means of execution through time. His genealogical consideration of power begins with the public execution of the condemned and moves on to the eighteenth century concept of the carceral system. It is a reformed punitive method that introduces the penal codes for control and discipline of society. In the same way that Foucault develops a link between social good and hegemonic power structures, literary/artistic objects can be linked to social control and hierarchy. For, certain literary objects, especially detective novels/narratives can be seen as indirect role of social control.

According to Foucault, public execution of the middle ages is a reflection of Sovereign power which proclaims the body for penal repression through physical torture. The spectacular element and the visibility of penal (monarchical) power declines with the decline of such executions. But with the introduction of the carceral confinement, the mechanism of power assumes a very subtle and a tactful operation. The individual bodies of the condemned are no longer subject to torture, but confined by force as a way of establishing power over physical liberty or freedom of the person, thereby indirectly penalizing the body. The “system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions” (*Discipline 11*), is an instrument of power and an entire power structure is considered upon it. Foucault explains: “As a result of the new restraint, a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they sing the praises that the law needs” (*Discipline 11*). Its claims that “the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive action” cannot be accepted without objection for the fact that “imprisonment, confinement, forced labour, penal servitude, prohibition from entering certain areas, deportation—which have occupied so important a place in modern penal systems—are ‘physical’ penalties” (*Discipline 11*).

With the subjection of the body, power is conveniently transmitted through the capillary structure of society since the individual is both politically and economically bound. In Foucault’s views:

The body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it.... This political invest of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument ...) the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. (*Discipline 26*)

This mechanism of power over the body is a strategy, manoeuvre, policy etc. to have a hold over truth or knowledge which is directly linked to social control and the disciplinary mechanism of society: “... power produces knowledge ... that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the

correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (*Discipline* 27). Thus, power and knowledge are inter-dependent. They enhance and reinforce each other.

The genre of detective fiction produces pleasure through the narrative’s understanding of crime and state power in surveilling transgression thereby maintaining a disciplinary society. The concept of social norms and codes results from certain “ideologically bound views” (Pyrhonen, *Academic Angle* 93). Pyrhonen shows how the pattern works in the nineteenth century and Golden Age detective texts. These narratives hold, inscribe the ideology of the class and culture that is dominant in society. Therefore, identifying deviants, surveillance of crime and executing punishment is not simply a reflection of justice. Rather it is associated with establishing and circulating state power. The state defines deviance as actions of individuals that do not fit within ideological parameters.

Thus surveillance and punishment are apparatuses of power that “did not hesitate to exert itself directly on bodies, (through physical torture in the Middle Ages and confinement in the modern times) but was exalted and strengthened by its visible manifestations; of a power that asserted itself as an armed power whose functions of maintaining order ... presented rules and obligations ... a breach of which constituted an offence ... of a power for which disobedience was an act of hostility, the first sign of rebellion ... of a power that had to demonstrate not why it enforced its laws, but who were its enemies ... of a power which in the absence of continual supervision, sought a renewal of its effects in the spectacle of its individual manifestations, of a power that was recharged in the ritual display of its reality as ‘super-power’” (*Discipline* 57).

So, the narrative seems to work as an ally of the state and to that extent is complicit with power.

In any social situation, the exercise of state power over individuals is carried through direct and indirect tools. While legal and penal structures are direct tools of corrective measures, there is no doubt that other tools are used with considerable effectiveness. Detective fiction is in a way a reflection of these tools in the sense that embodies narrative of crime and punishment. What is equally important, however, is de/recoding the relationship between crime and punishment. For, Foucault shows that the idea of

punishment is brought under a discursive practice that is founded on a rhetoric of correction, committed to the welfare, on the one hand, of the erring (deviant) individual and of the community at large. This is where there is the transmutation of codes that discipline and the codes that please.

In other words, narrative devices not only are complicit with power structures that back up hegemony but also transform narrative apparatuses into appropriate social equivalents. For example, endings may transmute pleasure of closure with a closural understanding of the social function of a deviant's death or defeat.

In the history of criminal justice systems, it is observed that power associated with punishment gradually mutates from a mechanism that demands discipline through the fear of physical torture to very subtle techniques of public illustrations or indirect instances that influence the individuals. In such a scenario, "power," "surveillance," "omnipotent gaze," "reform through knowledge" become enmeshed in a relativistic epistemology. In any social situation individual perceptions of punishment for a crime committed—appropriate and necessary or inappropriate or excessive—are guided not through the penal-judicial apparatus but through iterative discursive practices in literary texts, stage shows, etc. In other words, the modern power relations depend directly in the power to acquire knowledge about deviance or what Foucault terms as "a sort of general recipe for the exercise of power over men: the 'mind' as a surface of inscription for power" (ref). Moreover, all disciplinary mechanisms draw on disciplinary institutions that become the essential apparatus of surveillance, observation, control, and training. In Foucault's words: "[E]ach gaze would form a part of the overall functioning of power ... the disciplinary institutions secreted a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope of conduct" (*Discipline* 171-72). In this context, detective narratives work towards approximating the features that one associates with apparatuses of surveillance and in doing so, they create conditions where narrative pleasure and ideology work in tandem or as equivalents. The term ideology here invariably means hegemonic power, and the pleasure of these texts is an extension of these hegemonic policies by way of providing assurances of promoting and restoring social/moral norms and values.

### 1.1.10. Power and Knowledge: Writing as Examination

It would be instructive to further probe the relation between knowledge and power, given the complementarities of the relationship, and given that knowledge is a mechanism of objectification and domination of ideology. Foucault presents the domain of knowledge as power in entirety. Interestingly, he highlights the use of “examination” as one of the means assuring the visibility of power and its exercise over subjects. Even more interestingly, this mechanism of examination—both of scrutiny and interrogation, understood in the light of a cumulative medico-juridical vocabulary—is transformed into a describable apparatus.

Foucault says that the transformation is instituted through the procedure of writing, making it “possible to integrate individual data into cumulative systems” (*Discipline* 190). While this systemic transformation assists the state in accumulating information to adopt necessary disciplinary measures as social control, knowledge becomes the base for constructing a power structure “that constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge” (*Discipline* 192). Foucault returns to this particular use by the state or the dominant ideology of the subject as agent and target, and offers an overarching theory of power that co-opts the individual in transforming apparatuses of fear and terror, first, into socially desirable goals, and, subsequently, into a tools of pleasure. As this dissertation seeks to show, detective fiction and popular literary forms are more adept at not only linking the disciplinary mechanics of power to a thematic of pleasure but also creating narrative situations where they overlap.

This technique of exercising disciplinary power, contrary to direct exercise of sovereign power, is less terrorizing simply because it translates public exhibition of physical punishment into a textual mode of social compliance. The penal state works through a rhetoric of persuasion, given that what is on offer is a generalized—seemingly discreet and anonymous—procedure of divulging the truth about persons—who could be serial killers or parents of hideous children—though their medical histories, social, religious, educational backgrounds, etc. Foucault says: The chronicle of a man, the account of his life, his historiography, written as he lived out of his life, formed part of the *rituals* of his power ... made of this *description* a *means* of control and a *method* of domination. (*Discipline* 191; emphasis added)

Even as Foucault speaks of domination as a reflection of power itself, it is necessary to mark four words underscored in the lines cited above: rituals, description, means, and method. It is clear that Foucault looks at writing as an examination of power. In some detective texts, the detective is an agent of knowledge and power who is responsible for upholding social and moral values. The detective is endowed with social authority/power as well as expert knowledge on every conceivable field of life. It is this singular intelligence and knowledge that empowers the detective to get behind everything and take up the moral/judicial custodian's role to maintain a disciplined society.

In most detective narratives, the text positions the detective in such a way that his responsibility to establish what may appear to be a "hegemonic project" (Pyrhonen 102), mutates into an aesthetically transformed capacity to "mediate psychic protection" (Knight 67) to all classes. While the text offers various instances of power-play in the crime-detection frame, it also admits a mechanism for producing pleasure by "the circulation of social energy" (Greenblatt) through "textual negotiations" (Scholes). Greenblatt's idea is close to Foucault's, especially where the latter says that power and knowledge complement and substitute each other. Interestingly, this negotiation of power and knowledge is routed through the exercise of reporting—that is, writing—deviance. Foucault writes about the hospital and asylum as the apparatus of knowledge while dealing with lunatics and the diseased. In *Madness and Civilization* (1965), Foucault describes that hospitals were not just establishments to cure the sick, but they were actually seats of power which extended its hold and domination deep into the society by assuming the role of an ethical overseer. This is very similar to the traditional detective's role in society where he polices and protects the ruling class's idealistic world through his amazing knowledge about the whereabouts of criminals and crime. As suggested by Stephen Knight, narrative pleasure is in agreement with hegemonic ideology when the detective identifies "the real threat to respectable life," and also detects "the grim areas where the working-class and the 'dangerous classes' lived" (Knight 94).

Further, the operation of power within narrative and social systems points at interesting convergences and divergences. Power operated very differently in the seventeenth century houses of confinement like the Hopital General of Paris and the later modern concept of the Asylum by Pinel and Tuke. The purpose or the larger design of

moral/judicial means of intervention and repression is gained through the disposal of knowledge on the subjects. The directors of the General Hospital not only exercised their power within the establishment, “but throughout the city of Paris, over all those who came under their jurisdiction” (*Foucault Reader* 125). In other words, they penetrated into the social lives of the entire population in order to gather knowledge about delinquency, deviance and all kinds of social illegitimacy. “The Hospital General is not a medical establishment” (*Reader* 125), rather its function of policing the society makes it “a sort of semi judicial structure, an administrative entity which along with the already constituted powers, and outside of the courts, decides, judges and executes” (*Reader* 125).

In nineteenth century detective texts the narrative conforms to the already established forms of power in society, or quietly complies with the repressive state apparatus. The detective narrative itself becomes a semi-judicial discourse where crime and crime detection are followed by the mandatory arrest of the criminal, and in some cases trial and punishment too. In such instance, trials are mostly conducted by the detective himself and characters serve as the jury. Characters are summarily expelled from the narrative by way of arranging accidents or pre-designed killings, more as social than narrative requirements. This is what is called creative use of social equivalents for narrative purpose or vice versa. The legitimacy of the procedure of trial is never questioned because the detective represents state power, vouchsafes social order and implied norms and invariably rules out any form of transgression.

Given that social-moral-legal transgressions begin by “the weakening of discipline and the relaxation of morals” (*Reader* 137), this policing extends to charitable work in housing and confining beggars, vagabonds, mendicants, unemployed, and the idle, which is a disguised technique of acquiring firsthand knowledge of the source. Through the power of confinement and knowledge, the Hospital takes charge of correcting moral lapses and converts the city into a place of goodness and virtue and every citizen into moral beings. This view also reflects in the modern asylum which “must represent the great continuity of social morality. The values of family and work, all the acknowledged virtues, now reign in the asylum” (*Reader* 148). In this connection, Pinel’s asylum “is a juridical microcosm ... all the iconographic apurage of the judge and the executioner must be present in the mind of the madman, so that he understands what universe of

judgment he now belongs to” (*Reader* 155). In other words, the madman is considered as a transgressor and therefore must be made aware of his guilt. This establishes the fact that the lunatic is seen as resistant “to the moral and social uniformity that forms the *raison d’être* of Pinel’s asylum” (*Reader* 157).

To this extent, the asylum functions as the apparatus of power by acquiring knowledge, by confining the lunatic as a social deviant and trying to grasp the reason behind his/her unreason, which is mostly considered as a result of disordered morality. Detective narrative also functions like the asylum as the apparatus of power and deals with “questions of knowledge” (Pyrhonen 51) and “[E]xplores, through the figure of the detective, basic problems of knowledge and knowing” (Pyrhonen 51). In other words, textual pleasure circulates through the narrative ability to negotiate hegemonic knowledge on deviance and deviants, arresting disordered morality like Tuke and Pinel’s asylum, and arousing feelings of conformity to the norms of moral and social order. Like the Hospital, some detective texts detect transgression and subtly try to establish good against evil and right against wrong, thereby establishing hegemonic truth.

The eighteenth century clinic is also defined by Foucault in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1973), providing “the definition of a political status for medicine and the constitution, at state level, of a medical consciousness whose constant task would be to provide information, supervision, and constraint, all of which ‘relate as much to the police as to the field of medicine proper’” (*Birth* 26). It is the clinic and knowledge of medicine that functions as a means of surveillance and gaze over the moral and ethical lives of individuals within society. The doctor, therefore, assumes the role of political authority/power by utilizing their medical knowledge for acquiring knowledge about the state of health. Moreover, it is an indirect means of policing over the social/moral reason behind the spread of both epidemic and endemic diseases. Foucault explains the link between medicine and the state and shows how knowledge becomes an integral part of power and an apparatus of social control and order:

[Medicine] was given the splendid task of establishing in men’s lives the positive role of health, virtue, and happiness; it fell to medicine to punctuate work with festivals, to exalt calm emotions, to watch over what was read in books and seen in theatres, to see that marriages were made not out of self-interest or because of



a passing infatuation, but were based on the only lasting condition of happiness, namely, their benefit to the state. (*Birth* 34)

The knowledge of diseases, their transmission and the general state of health is directly related to knowledge and power over the moral health of citizens. Thus, “in the ordering of human existence [medicine] assumes a normative posture, which authorizes it not only to distribute advice as to healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral relations of the individual and of the society in which he lives” (*Birth* 34). Therefore, Foucault’s comment on the convergence of political ideology and those of medical technology speaks about knowledge as a social privilege turning medical gaze into a power that dominates and plays a quasi-judicial role. The detective story is an ideological state apparatus and like “madness and medicine, crime and crime detection are cultural phenomenon” (Porter 120). Since detective fiction foregrounds an established social order and its preservation through certain disciplinary norms, the authoritarian figure of the detective becomes inevitable. He is the unseen seer “who stands at the center of the social Panopticon and employs his ‘science’ to make all things visible on behalf of the forces of order” (Porter 125). Like the eighteenth century doctor, the traditional detective also assumes the role of authority and power in the discovery of crime (through his omniscience and infallibility) essential for maintaining social stability.

#### **1.1.11. The Panopticon**

In *The Pursuit of Crime* (1981), Dennis Porter’s views on the panopticon and social control following Michel Foucault is important. What Michel Foucault writes in *Discipline and Punish* (1977), about sobriety in punishment leads to the radical revision of the penal codes by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with constant surveillance or Bentham’s Panopticon “as the system of control established in the new age” (Porter 124). Porter further explains that the rise of human sciences is indispensable for the establishment of the disciplinary society as well as for the new police in understanding human behaviour through comprehensive surveillance and bureaucratic reporting. This becomes relevant in crime literature of the times which takes a stand to defend the established societal order. Porter writes:

Thus, by the time of Doyle, the Great Detective of fiction had himself the essential qualities of the unseen seer who stands at the center of the social Panopticon and employs his “science” to make all things visible on behalf of the forces of order.... It represents in its way the exercise of lucid power over an identified enemy of society. The detective story promotes the “heroization” of the agent of surveillance in his struggle against threats from within. (Porter 124-25)

Foucault’s concept of surveillance, knowledge, and power explained through the function of various disciplinary institutions, hospital/asylum, and the clinic can be summed up in his ideas on panopticism based on Bentham’s Panopticon. Constant supervision, permanent visibility and the state of being conscious about surveillance makes power automatically effective:

It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up.... The Panopticon ... produces homogeneous effects of power. (*Discipline* 202)

Thus, “the seeing machine ... has become a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be supervised by society as a whole” and “the panoptic schema ... was destined to spread throughout the social body” (*Discipline* 207). This technique of panopticism is reflected in the disciplinary mechanism of the Christian School, the hospital, religious groups and charity organizations, and gradually into the state-control taken over by the police apparatus. This panoptic state “administrative machine” (*Discipline* 213), functions in “the search for criminality, urban surveillance, economic and political supervision” (*Discipline* 213). It is not difficult to see that the power of this state apparatus depends entirely on its ability to “bear over anything” (*Discipline* 213), and maintain a knowledge of “everything that happens” and “those things of every moment” (*Discipline* 213). Knowledge is therefore a prerequisite of power where it is “coextensive with the entire social body” (*Discipline* 213).

Police apparatus as a derivative of the surveillance technique of Bentham’s Panopticon accumulates and centralizes knowledge of the citizens through “the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible.... It had

to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception ...” (*Discipline* 214). In a particular type of detective text, narrative pleasure circulates with the detective as the seeing machine looking for patterns in the clues he finds. It is not hard to see that knowledge becomes the prerequisite for the detective’s authority and power of social surveillance. To this end, power relations thrive on the dominance of panoptic knowledge, subjectifying and objectifying individuals and assuring discipline over the entire society. Further, Foucault explains the mechanism of a disciplined society as the technology of power through a body of knowledge:

“Discipline” may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an “anatomy” of power, a technology. And it may be taken over either by “specialized” institutions ... or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end ... or by pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power ... or by apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning ... or finally by state apparatuses whose ... functions is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole.... (*Discipline* 215-16)

Thus, narrative pleasure in detective fiction is linked to the detective’s power to know, intervene, penetrate, supervise, and rectify through knowledge. This technique is a shift from the spectacular aspect of power in the middle ages. Rather, it is a discreet technique of subjection through the power of knowledge over deviant minds and offensive social behaviour. The fact that the detective is able to discipline society according to the state apparatus thereby circulates pleasure through hegemonic norms and values.

#### **1.1.12. Carceral and Power**

The nineteenth century carceral system is the predecessor of modern state apparatuses exercising power through coercive laws of crime and punishment. It sets the parameters of normalization through incarceration of the physical self. This, thereby incarcerates or conditions the mind for subjection, and transfers its panoptic gaze over the entire social body. Regarding the Mettray prison, Foucault writes that “in the normalization of the power of normalization, in the arrangement of a power-knowledge over individuals,

Mettray and its school marked a new era” (*Discipline* 296). These prisons function as coercive schools of discipline and training by conditioning the body to an extreme type of regimen and constant surveillance forming a body of knowledge. Moreover, the information recorded about the social, familial, and criminal history of each inmate establishes a power relation that functions throughout society. In this connection, the carceral system is seen as the training college for discipline and “taught the art of power relation—a technique that was learnt, transmitted and which obeyed general norms” (*Discipline* 295).

Interestingly, the carceral system is a modern extension of the underlying power tactics behind the establishment of eighteenth century schools, hospitals, asylums, clinics etc. Foucault explains that “the generality of the punitive function that the eighteenth century sought in the ‘ideological’ technique of representations and signs now had as its support the extension, the material framework, complex, dispensed, but coherent of the various carceral mechanism” (*Discipline* 299). Foucault considers the carceral as a mechanism trying to establish the legality of its power to punish, but the offence no longer remains the focus. Rather, the departure from the norm and anomaly is attacked, thereby reflecting this punitive technique in schools, courts, asylums, or prisons. In this context, Foucault calls the delinquent an institutional product: “the social enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the multiple dangers of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral network linked, through innumerable relations, the two long multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal” (*Discipline* 299-300).

To this end, the carceral mechanism while normalizing its power actually arrests and captures the body and subjects it to its panoptic functioning or study that objectifies human nature. From the middle ages to the modern times, the various apparatuses of power have targeted the human body as the field for inscribing coercive forces and formation of knowledge. So, “the carceral ‘naturalizes’ the legal power to punish, as it ‘legalizes’ the technical power to discipline” (*Discipline* 303). Moreover, the corporal becomes the connecting link between deviance and the establishment of punitive power. But unlike physical torture, the modern politics of power functions through the submission of bodies directly related to the control of minds or ideas. Servan says:

When you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their masters. A

stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their ideas.... (cited in Foucault, *Discipline* 103)

Following the model of carceral mechanism and its punitive power, some detective texts borrow the apparatus of social order through dominant ideas and suppression of the mind. Thus, power transforms from being purely punitive and revengeful to the “ideological”—a renewed political anatomy—in which the mind becomes the principal character, represented in the narrative’s panoptic carceral continuum.

### **1.1.13. Race, Empire and Power**

Power relations can also be defined through the struggle between colonizers and colonized. The following concepts of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault are important:

- (i) Marx’s proclamation that the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas,
- (ii) Gramsci’s idea of the subaltern class or exploited class, and
- (iii) Foucault’s concept of individual subjection and recalcitrance are best exemplified in it.

The colonial ideology of power thrives on the manipulative and ambivalent distribution of knowledge, maintaining an illusory or false consciousness of satisfaction in the material conditions of the colonized, and most importantly, controlling or dominating the rise of polemical and revolutionary ideas among the suppressed class. Ashish Nandy writes:

This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all. In the process, it helps to generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds. (Nandy, *The Intimate* 9).

Frantz Fanon’s description reflects the inferiority complex and identity crisis of Black Antilleans suffering and struggling to become like whites—trying to speak, dress and

behave like them—a constant reminder of the “Lordship and Bondage” relationship. Fanon writes in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952): “The more the black Antillean assimilates the French language, the whiter he gets, i.e., the closer he comes to becoming a true human being” (Fanon, *Masks* 2). He also describes the overwhelming control and blockade imposed over the knowledge and self consciousness of colonized people. This ruling colonial ideology of domination determines the colonized’s belief in the superiority of the colonizer:

All colonized people—in other words, people in whom an inferiority complex has taken root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave-position themselves in relation to the civilizing language: i.e., the metropolitan culture. The more the colonized has assimilated the cultural values of the metropolis, the more he will have escaped the bush. The more he rejects his blackness and the bush, the whiter he will become. (Fanon, *Masks* 2-3)

Further, colonial power is established through de-recognition and demonization of native ethics and values. It is clearly seen that the native ideological apparatuses in the colonial world are made defunct due to white totalitarian control of the colonized’s economic base. Fanon writes in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), about this condition:

As if to illustrate the totalitarian nature of colonial exploitation, the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of quintessence of evil. Colonized society is not content with stating that the colonized world has lost its values or worse never possessed any. The “native” is declared impervious to ethics, representing not only the absence of values but also the negation. (Fanon, *Wretched* 6)

To this end, the colonizer strengthens power through the church—an already extended dominion—by way of propagating false or illusory consciousness. Clearly, the colonized’s God compellingly becomes the “God of the other” and the native remains in subjection to the white religious ideology: “The Church in the colonies is a white man’s church, a foreigners’ Church. It does not call the colonized to the ways of God, but to the ways of the white man, to the ways of the master, the ways of the oppressor” (Fanon, *Wretched* 7).

To this extent, the colonizer’s power works through the political as well as the cultural space of the colonized world resulting is displacement from the native social structure.

Moreover, the native's self consciousness and identity is demoralized through the master-slave relationship. The white's ideology of conquering minds, selves and cultures has been achieved through the tactics of deifying the West. There is also gradual destruction and isolation of the subaltern's (exploited) consciousness of the self and necessary cultural roots. The subject's response to power and the native's self-exclusion owing to subordination can be seen as a mutual phenomenon. This can be further elaborated by Hegel's philosophical analysis of the latent power struggle in master-slave relationship:

Each Self has before it another Self in and through which it secures its identity. Initially, there is an antagonism and enmity between these two confronting selves; each aims at the cancellation or death and destruction of the Other. Hence, and temporarily, a situation arises where one is merely recognized while the other recognizes. (see Gandhi, *Theory* 16)

Further, Hegel maintains that:

The master and slave are, initially locked in a compulsive struggle-unto-death. This goes on until the weak-willed slave, preferring life to liberty, accepts his subjection to the victorious. When these two antagonists finally face each other after battle, only the master is recognizable. The slave, on the other hand, is now a dependent "thing" whose existence is shaped by, and, as, the conquering Other. (see Gandhi, *Theory* 16-17)

Foucault refers to the colonizing mechanics of power as the "power of mind over mind" over anything else. Thus, in the process of captivating the native mind the white adopts an attitude of denigrating everything in the colonized land, thereby exploiting and repressing the native's ideological domain. In other words, the ideas of the ruling class implicitly abolish the entire system of thoughts of native existence, gradually disorienting and imprisoning the native in his own land. This imprisonment is more of a psychological effect than a physical one. To this end, Fanon writes: "the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.... Their metaphysics, or less pretentiously their customs and the agencies to which they refer, were abolished because they were in contradiction with a new civilization that imposed its own" (*Wretched* 90). The colonial effort of forming a nation populated exclusively with subalterns begins with

a much pro-colonial education system—a technique of ideological eye-wash. This is considered as the beginning of instilling the behaviour of subjection to the white’s authority. This can be explained by Fanon’s description of the Antillean black schoolboy who is taught to look at the white as one who liberates him with his knowledge: “In the Antilles, the black schoolboy who is constantly asked to recite ‘our ancestors the Gauls’ identifies himself with the explorer, the civilizing colonizer, the white man who brings truth to the savages, a lily-white truth” (*Wretched* 126). The epithets “savage,” “beast of burden,” “Negro” etc. are denominations that emerge from the white’s power and authority over the “indigenous social fabric” (*Wretched* 5-6).

#### **1.1.14. Power and Resistance**

Foucault’s comment that wherever there is power there is resistance is very true given the context of colonial rule, because “the psychological resistance to colonialism begins with the onset of colonialism” (Gandhi 17). De-colonization is a process of striving to possess the position of authority by the native which the colonizer enjoyed so long: “And its true there is not one colonized subject who at least once a day does not dream of taking the place of the colonist” (*Wretched* 5). In this connection, the compartmentalization that existed between “whites” and “natives” continues in the de-colonized world between the colonized bourgeoisie and the subaltern class that this power creates. The mechanics of power by dominating the mind and eventual recalcitrance is an ongoing process that begins in the struggle for de-colonization. In the next phase, it transforms into a struggle among the indigenous nation against bourgeoisie power. In other words, when Prospero leaves Caliban’s Island, Caliban utilizes the same techniques of domination used on him by Prospero, resulting in the island’s native inhabitants’ revolt against Caliban’s power. Thus, “de-colonization ... focuses on and fundamentally alters beings, and transforms the spectator crushed to a nonessential state into a privileged actor ...” (*Wretched* 2).

It is not difficult to see that the national bourgeoisie taught by the hedonistic powers of the colonizer extends its exploitative manoeuvres on the weaker people thereby preparing a ground for complete resistance towards its political, cultural and economic ideology. This can be better explained by the various nationalist parties’ methods of reinforcing their pre-determined schema of governance and power and the rural masses’ resistance towards it. It is a power struggle between the urban and the rural population or



a war between the capitalist and the traditionalist. Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* describes this capitalist exploitative power which fosters distrust between the peasant class and the town dweller in a decolonized nation:

Dressed like a European, speaking his language, working alongside him, sometimes living in his neighborhood, he is considered by the peasant to be a renegade who has given up everything, which constitutes the national heritage. The town dweller is a ‘traitor, a mercenary’.... It is the opposition between the colonized excluded from the benefits of colonialism and their counterparts who manage to turn the colonial system to their advantage. (*Wretched* 67)

In this context, the decolonized nation is fragmented into the ruling power represented by “progressive heads” (*Wretched* 72), which is opposed by a recalcitrant power resulting from subjection and dissatisfaction of the rural masses. The national government’s prejudice and mistrust upon them is a reflection of the same tactics and hostility which the colonizers had adopted during colonization. Thus, “the national government’s attitude toward the rural masses is reminiscent in some ways of the colonial power” (*Wretched* 72). Clearly, national bourgeoisie power and capitalism are two sides of the same coin, and nationalization fostered by this section is a tactics of transferring capitalist power into its own hands passed on by the colonial rule. It is this mercantile power structure that becomes the target of mass resistance. The Manichaeism of the colonial society still persists in the decolonized nation and a great divide exists between the worlds of those who hold economic power and those who are ruled by this power.

Resistance to the national bourgeoisie ideology results from its exploitative power, and preferential attitude towards economic prosperity of certain regions after decolonization has been inherited from the colonizers. This is one of the major reasons behind creating a split among the population of a colonized nation resulting from unequal economic progress throughout the country. Fanon describes this phenomenon of economic inequality as: “In the aftermath of independence the nationals who live in prosperous regions realize their good fortune and their gut reaction is to refuse to feed the rest of the nation” (*Wretched* 106). This is an instance of the colonial tactics of securing power which are repeated as neo-colonial mechanisms of the capitalist apparatus. To this end, whether it is the power relation between state apparatus and deviance, sovereign and subjects, colonizer and colonized, or decolonized bourgeoisie power and the deprived

mass, it is always through the victimization of the body that the mind is influenced to accept submission. Physical torture and imprisonment, denigrating the native's body, and deprivation of the body through economic/material deprivation is seen as means of subjectifying the mind through subjection of the body. Moreover, resistance to any kind of power is a battle against the different tactics of exploiting both body and mind, and also for securing its rights. In this context, some twentieth century detective texts present the conflict between "legitimate" social/political ideology and narrative pleasure. In fact, pleasure circulates with the defiance and resistance to established ideologies. These narratives challenge the notion of legitimacy and hegemonic dominance.

#### **1.1.15. Ideological/Repressive State Apparatuses**

Any kind of power is an assertion of the conflict between different ideological powers, where the strategy of legitimating one particular ideological belief over others thrives. In other words, it is also a mechanism of legitimating social/political/juridical interests of a dominant power. In this sense, a dominant power always influences the social superstructure (esp. political, religious, ethical, aesthetic etc.) of a given society. Moreover, this superstructure or in Althusser's words, the ideological state apparatuses influence the functioning of the repressive state apparatuses and vice-versa. Thus, the state as a composite of both the ISAs and the RSAs are actually a legitimation of the ruling power and its ideological interests. According to Terry Eagleton:

A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself. (Eagleton, *Ideology* 5-6)

Power is not only about the assertion of dominant ideologies, but it is also a challenge to a particular social order. In a broader sense, it is an intersection between emerging belief systems and the ruling political power. Antonio Gramsci's concept of Hegemony is not amply "a whole range of practical strategies by which a dominant power elicits consent to its rule from those it subjugates" (*Ideology* 116). Rather, it is a force that foments proletariat consciousness or contradictory consciousness that challenges hegemonic

domination. To this end, the terms ideology and hegemony are synonymous, and it is not only about class power, but also the relations between “governing and dominated classes in society as a whole” (*Ideology* 122). The contention that class power—defining social order and its legitimacy as normative acceptance in relation to the subaltern classes’ endorsement of their rights and its legitimacy—is a contest between licit state power and illicit powers. Raymond Williams explains this as “counter-hegemonic” forces which “oppose or break from the dominant ideologies” (Ferretter, *Louis Althusser* 139).

Williams writes: “The reality of any hegemony, in the extended political and cultural sense, is that, while by definition it is always dominant, it is never either total or exclusive. At any time, forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture exist as significant elements in the society” (Ferretter 139). In this connection, fiction or any work of art should be considered in the light of its world vision or what Lucien Goldmann calls the “trans-individual mental structures” of a social group—by which he means the structure of ideas, values and aspirations that group share (Eagleton, *Marxism and Literary Criticism* 32). The gaps or silences in literary texts signify the latent ideological conflicts. In other words, every work of art reflects the solicitation of social order versus transgression vis-a-vis power and domination, and the questions of its legitimacy. In this context, William Shakespeare’s several plays which are generally studied for its values of social order and stability has been examined to highlight that behind the apparent appearance of harmony, there are counter-hegemonic forces of power and coercive forces of social control by victimizing the body. Moreover, these plays are the ideological grounds for refuting patriarchal and sovereign forms of power.

#### **1.1.16. Power and Transgression**

In *Macbeth*, with Duncan’s murder, the desire for power and subversion of a given social order can be seen as a transgressive move for social change. The three witches symbolize the immateriality of the border between the licitness and the illicitness of human ambition and the need to redefine a given hierarchical structure of power. Moreover, the witches are Macbeth’s unconscious “other” or the universal instinct of intransigence towards the official order. Terry Eagleton describes this symptom in his work *William Shakespeare* (1986), as the “bourgeois individualist appetite where “there is a style of transgression ... in which all found values are satirized and deranged; and there is ... related disruptiveness of bourgeois individualist appetite, which in its ruthless drive to be

all, sunders every constraint ...” (*Shakespeare* 5). Further, Lady Macbeth along with the witches represent the catalytic “Other” that brings in change in the regularities, settled order and repressive norms of a given official society. This becomes essential for Macbeth to dissolve, disrupt and re-materialize the hierarchy of power. Marx and Engels define the ambivalence of transgression in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), as the bourgeoisie necessity of existence to constantly revolutionize all social relation:

Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier one. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.... (Eagleton, *Shakespeare* 5)

Since the king is the symbol of social order, in *Henry IV Part I*, Hotspur and his allies are the opposing hegemonic forces which do not only demystify the legitimacy of the ruling class, but also help in incorporating conflicting and contradictory views that are necessary for understanding class relations and power of a particular social class. Moreover, control and order is subverted by Sir John Falstaff who represents the unofficial carnivalesque culture which is below social order and decorum. Terry Eagleton writes that he “is more at home with drunks than dukes, and so represents a danger to political stability apparent at once in his body and speech” (*Shakespeare* 15). In other words, Falstaff’s animalistic materiality of the body represents the antithesis of order, that is, gross disorder, and his bawdy language refutes social imperatives. The ideas of dominance of the ruling class—royal power and aristocracy—are opposed by Falstaff’s scornful words “against the airy abstractions of ruling-class rhetoric” (*Shakespeare* 15): “Can honour set a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that word? Honour. What is that honour? Air” (Eagleton, *Shakespeare* 15).

Further, this opposition and hostility which are responsible for overpowering the dominant class and achieving a new class’ hegemony is explained by Shylock’s defiance of the ambiguous Venetian law and Christian justice in *The Merchant of Venice*. The fact that the state juridical structure operates by creating a gap between the general nature of

law and privileged or private law for the powerful class shows how Portia's quibble serves as a flagrant distortion of law. In this connection Terry Eagleton points out:

Portia threatens to bring the law into disrepute, skating perilously close to promoting 'private law'.... There is a ruthless precision about her sense of the text which exactly parallels Shylock's relentless insistence on having his bond.... Shylock is triumphant vindicated even though he loses the case: he has forced the Christians into outdoing his 'inhuman' legalism.... Shylock never really expected to win ... he is hardly well placed to do so, as a solitary, despised outsider confronting a powerful, clubbish ruling class. One can ... see what dodge the Christians will devise to let one of their own kind off the hook. (*Shakespeare* 37-38)

Thus, class law wields power which can do away with the application of impartial justice at intervals, because it writes the rules of such legal games. Shylock who is the non-ruling "other" deconstructs the Venetian law thereby deconstructing the prejudiced social order by his protest against Christian anti-Semitism and social outcasts who do not have hold over material production and ruling ideas:

You have among you many a purchas'd slave,  
Which, like your asses and your dogs and mules,  
You use in abject and in slavish parts,  
Because you bought them; shall I say to you  
'Let them be free, marry them to your heirs-  
Why sweat they under burdens? – let their beds  
Be made as soft as yours, and let their palates  
Be season'd with such viands'? (Eagleton, *Shakespeare* 47)

The issue of social order and control in *Measure for Measure* is dealt by making the body and desire as targets of repression. The Duke of Vienna is seen to apply panopticism by appointing Angelo as a moral guardian and repressive legalist. While policing fornication in Viennese society, Angelo's own moral turpitude is supervised

upon, and this redefines the rift between the imposition of autocratic legalism and libertinism. Angelo's ambiguous handling of law and justice regarding fornication has echoes of the ruling class' discriminations against the normative and the impersonal operations of justice. It is seen that the body and its weaknesses are sought to be penalized in order to maintain social order. Angelo's power is not only anarchical but also exploitative as far as Mariana and Claudio's cases are concerned. His precise enforcement of law is a repressive apparatus which tries to curb the fundamental human pleasure-principle or in Rabelais' term the "carnavalesque." The Viennese Duke, Vincentio's magical combination of justice and clemency is a cunning schema of power for preserving political stability and securing an unchallenged hegemonic dominance.

## II

### **1.2.1. Detective Fiction and Complicity**

Detective narratives can be studied as having political resonance for their role in the redistribution of the power structure of a given society. Detection of crime can be seen as conflict between the official and the non-official and reaffirmation of the existing relations of power. These narratives usually produce an underlying power struggle and the textual world is threatened or challenged by a crisis in the guise of an invading power. In other words, the narrative as an ideological apparatus foregrounds a negotiation of two types of power—a kind of power that unsettles, disturbs, and terrorizes another kind of power—state power. To this end, power which contests authority may not always be categorized within established limitations of the legitimate and the illegitimate. Rather it is an ideological conflict with the power structure regarding race, religion, social hierarchy, scientific knowledge, political disputes, and secrets that refute stability.

Select narratives of crime and detection written in the nineteenth century—where the dominant ideology of the text complies with power structures of society—idealizes and rationally resists any destruction of norms of civilization and harmony. The belief in the mechanism of state apparatus can be explained in Hegel's definition of the civilized man:

“Man becomes the individual through society and civilization, saw the State as the organ of the highest human values” (Higgins 69). Such narratives define pleasure by making a learned or trained response to issues of social power. The narrative intention conforms to the role of congenial members of society by accepting the social necessities and rejecting individual fundamental desires. To this extent, these detective texts analyze the relationship between individual and society, where society embodying the best form of human values is found to be embedded in the narrative design. It circulates pleasure by perceiving society as sources of values for individual as “moral person.” These narratives foreground the notion of “good” and “bad.” Following Foucault’s definition of power in *Madness and Civilization*, these narratives consider power not as a juridical conception which says “no,” rather as a productive network which runs through the whole social body. From this, it can be argued that such narratives foreground power not as a restraining or controlling agent, but as a mechanism of progress, civilized existence and social harmony.

Referring to this type of narrative, Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” can be seen as an example of detective text where the production and circulation of pleasure is preconditioned by accepting who is to be defended and who is to be condemned by the state. Through the design of protecting the social hierarchy of power, the narrative constantly seeks allegiance with the conditioning of social order. This is better defined by what Maurice J. Bennett writes in his essay “The Detective Fiction of Poe and Borges” (1983): “The moral thrust of a Poe detective story is the re-establishment of conventional order. This derives from his notion of a harmonious universe, and the narrative re-enacts the original divine creation of order from chaos and its maintenance against the forces of disruption” (Bennett 270). This striving for order is demarcated very early in the narrative through the words of the Prefect of the Parisian Police: “...the disclosure of the document to a third person, who shall be nameless, would bring in question the honor of a personage of most exalted station; and this fact gives the holder of the document an ascendancy over the illustrious personage whose honor and peace are so jeopardized” (Poe 207). From this, it can be said that power is identified and classified into what is considered as the socially legitimate and antisocial power. In Poe’s narrative on the theft of the letter, the Minister D is denigrated for the anticipated misuse of power; therefore, Dupin’s desire and the narrative intention are reciprocal. Further, towards the end of the narrative when Dupin voices his political rivalry with the Minister D and

partisanship with the royal lady whose letter had been purloined, the text circulates pleasure in the anticipation of the political destruction of the Minister—“an unprincipled man of genius” (Poe 222-23), and the re-establishment of the sovereign power and honor. Thus, it is seen that the narrative has a palpable design in compartmentalizing what is socially acceptable and what is illegitimate and thereby generating pleasure by venerating the “ideal.”

Forms of detective novels like Wilkie Collins’ *The Moonstone* (1868), Agatha Christie’s *The Mystery of the Blue Train* (1928) and Dorothy Sayers’ *Unnatural Death* (1927), offer narratives where pleasure is identical with the value system of idealized civilized societies. The narrative preconditions an expectation that coincides with the detective’s desire of unraveling the truth yielding knowledge that establishes authority in the social/penal structure of a given society. In this form, the corpus of the text foregrounds an ideology that is compliant with the ideals and legitimate boundaries of a given society. It is observed that these narratives never sympathize with the “bad” or that which is not morally/socially sanctioned. Rather, the text’s loyalty with established power structure and codes of social regulation appeals to a responsible and law-abiding response, producing pleasure in seeing the wrong being penalized and the good restored their power, position and honour. This type of pleasure can be defined by what William W. Stowe writes about Auden’s opinion about detective novels:

A detective novel is for Auden a quasi-liturgical text, an occasion for the ritual reenactment of a combination of confession, absolution and scapegoating. It celebrates community by defining it as a relatively innocent “we” over against a clearly guilty “other” (Stowe, “Critical Investigations” 574).

This means that the innocent’s acquittal and the punishment of the “creators of disorder and disharmony” (Stowe 574), is desirable/pleasurable and comforting. To this end, the narratives of this category circulate pleasure not from the knowledge of truth that the telos reveals, but from the acceptance and aspiration of social power structures and moral codes that this knowledge derived power provides.

In *The Moonstone*, Mr. Bruff, the solicitor’s consent to allow Franklin Blake a meeting with Rachel Verinder at his house, Rachel condescending to listen to Blake’s confession of the theft and providing him a chance to re-enact the action of stealing the diamond



under the influence of opium re-establishes the temporarily usurped moral codes. Moreover, Rachel's pain and suffering on discovering Blake's guilt on the night of her birthday symbolizes the displeasure or agony created by the disturbance in the pattern of accepting the "good" and the "evil." When Ezra Jennings' theory of "laudanum" is proved correct and Sgt. Cuff's assumption of the criminal sealed inside an envelope turns out to be true, there is a sense of relief. This happens not only because the criminal is caught and the harmony of the narrative is achieved, but also from the feeling that the sense of the "legitimate" and the "illegitimate" has been justified by the narrative.

Similarly, in *The Mystery of the Blue Train*, Katherine Grey's character is symbolic of the need to negotiate with conditions in the narrative that guarantee re-organization of the disturbed social order. Though Hercule Poirot is technically responsible to resolve the chaos, his invitation to Katherine Grey to "investigate this affair together" (*Mystery* 131), is a symbolical invitation echoing the narrative intention of the quest for truth and to "insure the re-integration and harmony of an entire social order" (Grella 45). Further, Katherine's involvement in the entire episode of the train journey, the murder and emotional attachment with the prime suspect Derek Kettering symbolizes a subconscious narrative empathy for him. Further, the fact that Katherine hallucinates Ruth Kettering's apparition revealing the murderer shows how it is connected to her psychological desire/wish that needs to be legitimized by the narrative design of the novel. In this sense, Katherine represents an individual's idealization of society where social harmony can be translated into the re-establishment of social hierarchy. In this novel, pleasure is conditioned by the narrative's social design where definition of the "innocent" and the "guilty" is determined by established social hierarchy.

In *Unnatural Death*, pleasure has been defined by what William W. Stowe explains as the detective's power: "If the culprit ... is the person readers love to hate, the detective represents the kind of power that readers would presumably like to have over those they consciously or unconsciously consider their enemies" (Stowe 574-75). In this context, the narrative does not withhold teleological revelation and pleasure depending on the nexus between power of the social world and criminal world. Given that the first section of the narrative provides enough evidence of Mary Whittaker's murderer of Agatha Dawson, pleasure is circulated in the text through the desire to overpower "evil" by "the detective [who] is a strong, charismatic male with a personal code of justice and honor

that is far superior to mere law” (Stowe 575). Moreover, Lord Peter Wimsey’s “extra-legal superman” quality is explained in Stowe’s words: “Although he is neither a politician nor a businessman, he makes himself indispensable to those in power: police chiefs, district attorneys, wealthy heads of families and corporations” (Stowe 575). Thus, the narrative intention identifies with the detective’s desire and super power of providing justice to the wronged. Further, Peter Wimsey’s assistant, Miss Climpson’s life-risking chance to salvage his venture of arresting social transgression is seen as idolizing the champion of truth/justice and preserver of social order.

The larger design and intention of detective narratives is to transcend the given and establish an extra-textual relationship that transcodes the text beyond its formal closure and problematizes the production and circulation of narrative pleasure through politics of power. The narrative assumes the role of an overhead surveillance apparatus that either participates, collaborates and surrenders to state power, or resists and disrupts authority, while sometimes it subverts the power mechanics. The narrative creates power structures of its own that are complicit, contestatory or subversive to established authority.

In *The Moonstone* (1868), *Unnatural Death* (1927), and *The Mystery of the Blue Train* (1928), the textual body circulates power that evolves from racial superiority, social hierarchy, notions of gentleman and villain, as well as the power to connive and threaten the judicial authority. To this extent, these texts interpret crime and detection as reflections of the varied power relations that pervade through every social set up. *The Moonstone* and *The Mystery of the Blue Train* are narratives which echo Althusser’s view of the ruling class or dominant class. There is in fact no power struggle between the social and antisocial, rather the narrative participates in the power of authority. The narrative design is pre-conditioned by a power that does not challenge authority, rather believes in the power structure set up by the state. The narrative’s omnipotent/omniscient gaze is intended to maintain the social rules and norms that the concept of panopticism proposes.

In this connection, detective narratives which participate in the production and circulation of authorized power also condition the circulation of narrative pleasure from the fact that pleasure is an exact mirror image of this type of power. Both are complementary in the sense that these narratives are what Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* refers to Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon: “[The Panopticon] laid down the

principle that power should be visible and unverifiable” (Goodlad, “Beyond Panopticon” 539-56). In other words, the narratives of *The Moonstone*, *The Mystery of the Blue Train*, and *Unnatural Death* function as the panopticon in being apparatuses of visibility of state power and establishing it without raising the need to verify or question its autonomy and legitimacy. Further, by symbolizing power through surveillance, the corpses of the texts assume roles of normativization in a given society. These narratives as the “overseer” also operate as devices that superintend those in power and authority and secure it from being abused. These narratives are utopias of governance where society identifies two kinds of classes—the rulers and the subjects, where recalcitrance is always answered by its domination, arrest and resumption of order. Contrary to what Foucault describes in his revised views on subject as: “Subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving ... may be realized” (Goodlad 545), it is seen that the detective texts which participate in state power do not perceive subjects as free, rather only creates illusions of freedom in circulating tools of pleasure.

Terms like “legitimate” and “illegitimate” are already pre-conditioned in these narratives according to the social hegemonic parameters. The conditioned narrative design of the state and its representatives of power as agents or transmitters of the “official” and as regulators of the “unofficial” rejects the possibility of freedom of its subjects. Thus, narratives produce pleasure by conditioning the requirement of labels as legitimate and illegitimate, and also providing illusory means of choice in a democratic society, which is actually non-existent. Moreover, the narratives are able to convince its techniques and targets of policing without providing the necessity to explain or define its unspecified laws. This circulation of pleasure through the reflection of state power can be further understood as a reproduction of the “dominant value system” (see Cheal, “Hegemony, Ideology and Contradictory Consciousness”), that “defines the existing reward system as morally just and desirable” (Cheal 111), while rejecting any space or scope for the “subordinate value system” and its doubts and ambivalence. These narratives of power produce pleasure through a very loyal, ethical and unambiguous reflection of state power structures.

### **1.2.2. Detective Fiction and Resistance**

A category of detective narratives foreground ideologies that resist power structures and social formations. These narratives substitute ideas for repressed fundamental desires and

bridge the gap between an individual's false conformity and personal non-conformity of social formations. Pleasure is produced through the realization of restrained desires and beliefs and the narrative no longer requires to acquiescing the role of a repressed subject. In other words, the narrative world symbolizes freedom from acquiescing to a social existence that is no longer accepted. Thus, pleasure depends on the textual body functioning as the representation of reality, which otherwise is an imitation of unfulfilled or repressed desire. The narrative is not ideologically allegiant to state power, and is seen to sympathize with socially non-sanctioned act. Such narratives legitimize the desire for the "illegitimate" by resisting social control and demystifying established forms of power. Pleasure in these narratives of crime is produced by the psychological cross-over from the social world to the subversive world, thereby realizing the otherwise unacceptable desires.

This can be further explained by considering a few of Arthur Conan Doyle's work: "The Devil's Foot;" "The Adventure of the Abbey Grange;" "A Scandal in Bohemia" and "The Final Problem." In the narratives "The Devil's Foot" and "The Adventure of the Abbey Grange," the murderers Dr. Leon Sterndale and Captain Jack Crocker are exonerated by Sherlock Holmes of their crime which is seen as a defiance of juridical norms of the state. Holmes is a private detective having considerable differences and rivalries with the Scotland Yard Police, but in most of his cases, he is seen to operate for the preservation of the norms of the penal world. In the cases concerning Sterndale and Crocker, Holmes makes use of his power in a way that is not socially sanctioned. From this it is suggested that the narrative does not condemn Holmes' judgment, rather it provides a socially antithetical pleasure. This is a masochistic form of pleasure where the narrative sympathizes and owns the situation of the murderers that led them to commit the crime. The reader's fundamental desire of non-conformism which has been repressed by the social values now resurfaces in his conscious psyche and seeks satisfaction of pleasure-ego by the narrative subversion of social control. When Dr. Sterndale avenges his beloved's murder by poisoning the murderer, and when Captain Crocker rescues Mary Fraser from the physical assaults of her brutal husband by killing him, the pleasure of these texts is conditioned by the ideological re-construction of the social definition of "crime" and "criminal."

The cases in which Holmes' power is challenged by the wit of a lady, Irene Adler, in "A Scandal in Bohemia," and by the criminal genius of Professor James Moriarty in "The Final Problem," are instances where pleasure circulates not through the unequal combat between the intellectually superior "pursuer" and the inferior, prone to be caught "pursued." It is rather a kind of narrative subjective wish fulfilment when Holmes' private code of justice reinforces official law and order. When Irene Adler usurps the prerogatives of Holmes' surveillance powers, pleasure is produced by turning around the order, otherwise guaranteed by his superhuman qualities. Similarly, the primal position that is given to Professor Moriarty in the world of crime is due to his genius and "mastermind of a vast bureaucracy of criminal activity" (Jann, "Sherlock Holmes Codes the Social Body" 701). It can be said that Moriarty's calculated and cold blooded criminal activities which sends a shiver through Holmes in "The Final Problem" shatters the iconoclasm that surrounds Holmes' personality. The fact that Holmes admits Moriarty to be the only foe on the same intellectual plane as him foregrounds narrative non-conformist desires to venerate someone who is capable of disturbing the fortified social order. Moriarty is the permissive reality that subverts and disrupts what D.A. Miller refers to as the detective's "supervision" of creating "the prospect of an absolute surveillance under which everything would be known, incriminated, policed" (Jann 687).

Some detective narrative like Frederick Forsyth's *The Day of the Jackal* (1971), Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose* (1984), and Dan Brown's *Angels and Demons* (2000), offer narratives where pleasure is produced from an antithetical relation with power structures and social formations of the text. What Lacan terms as the "real of desire" can be considered as the fulfilment of pleasure-ego expressed through the anti-authoritarian perspective of these narratives. Slavoj Žižek explains in his work, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (1992), about repressed desire that gets reflected and realized in one's dream: "Our common everyday reality, the reality of the social universe in which we assume our usual roles of kind-hearted, decent people, turns out to be an illusion that rests on a certain 'repression,' on overlooking the real of our desire" (Žižek 17). To this extent, it is not only dreams that satisfy "the real of our desire" and narrative non-conformism can satisfy the urge of being what Žižek refers as: "In our unconscious, in the real of our desire, we are all murderers" (Žižek 16). Thus, it redefines social control and authorized power, and thereby circulates pleasure by abandoning that which is a socially obliging façade, otherwise achieved through the

“disciplinary codes” of civilized society. This kind of reading experience can be compared to the pleasure created by the gross and the flagrancy of the carnivalesque culture of Middle Ages. It is an antisocial pleasure of seeing the king flogged and the social-deviant being hero-worshipped. In this sense, these narratives produce pleasure by resisting established forms of power and assisting in creating “an act of ideological non-conformism.”

In *The Day of the Jackal*, recalcitrance redefines the “legitimate” and the “illegitimate,” making the text a means of pleasure through that which is socially-deviant. The power struggle between Claude Lebel, the Deputy Chief of the French Intelligence, and the Jackal is an unequal one given that a nation’s entire repressive apparatus stands against one individual who disrupts the power structure not only of France, but also England, Belgium and Italy. The narrative design defies the norm of the detective as an omnipotent, omniscient superhuman, entrusted with the responsibility of restoring social order by arresting the “secret.” Moreover, it does not function as an apparatus of conformity, by creating a barricading the detective’s desire to pursue and unravel the “secret.” The character of the Jackal is seen as the realization of pleasure-ego into reality-ego which Freud explains in *The Unconscious*: “... he becomes the king, hero, creator, favourite he wanted to be, without having to make the enormous detour of actually changing the outside world” (Freud 17). When Gaston Grosjean refuses to help the police by withholding information about the Jackal’s movements, it is the subjects’ non-conformism with the ruler’s power and social ideal that in turn can be identified with the reader’s pleasure from fulfilment of such non-sanctioned desires. To this extent, by venerating the deviant image of the Jackal, the narrative intention transgresses from a given society’s moral/penal domain and seeks pleasure from anti-authoritarian indulgence.

In *The Name of the Rose*, the detective William of Baskerville is considered as an ecclesiastical version of Sherlock Holmes’ infallible power of surveillance anticipated in tracking the horse Brunellus. But the narrative gradually develops an anti-detective perspective which keeps William’s power a step behind the power of the “secret,” “truth” and “knowledge.” Jorge of Burgos is seen as the unrivalled keeper of the secrets of abbatial world, which are in other words a safeguarding of his own personalized system of beliefs. Jorge’s dictatorial and anarchical control over the governance of the

abbey and absolute power over the mechanics of the library (aedificium) suggests an order that functions undemocratically and against the juridical apparatus of a given social order. The design of inaccessibility to Aristotle's second book on *Poetics* by Jorge is motivated by his very private philosophy of Christianity. Pleasure of the text circulates through the narrative intention of preserving Jorge's philosophy. It is symbolized by preventing universal access to the library in general and the book in particular through the destruction of both. To this extent, the narrative does not always intend the righteous to thrive, rather designs supra-human abilities like that of Jorge to prevail and prosper. William—the detective, who represents the Abbot in his power to surveil the crimes within the abbey—is superfluous like that of the Abbot's ostensible authority/power. In this case, pleasure does not depend on the detective's desire to restore the narrative's universal order and harmony. Rather, the narrative identifies strongly with Jorge's "secret" symbolizing every individual's hidden world susceptible to being plundered by legitimate representatives of social authority.

*Angels and Demons* as a detective narrative produces pleasure by fulfilling the desire for the socially non-sanctioned by breaking down established authority and social formations. The infiltration of security at CERN and the Vatican, failure to prevent the serial murders and threat to Robert Langdon's life, otherwise considered as the infallible superhuman detective, produce non-conformist pleasure in the possibility of disrupting the impenetrable and undefeatable. The Camerlengo's power to manage "secret" and Langdon's fallibility in this power struggle to decode the "secret" is the pleasure-principle of the text. In the entire narrative, power of the illegitimate thrives and overshadows the power of social/moral authority to the extent that even the papal power of the Vatican is subverted. In this narrative, though the deviant is not venerated, his extraordinary potential in administering and managing crime, and his power to retaliate the established and acknowledged (social/moral/judicial) is desired. The latent fundamental drive for intransigence towards established forms of power is satisfied through the narrative world's attempt to sanction the means of non-sanctioned pleasure. Thus, the Camerlengo's and the Hassassin's subterranean power in creating splits and flaws in the security systems of CERN and the Vatican's Swiss Guards, and operating ahead of Langdon's surveillance produce pleasure through the subversion of legitimate power, a transgression of the restricted domain of social control.

The second category of detective narratives resist or contest the state authority by trying to substitute, replace or destroy established structures of power by an alternative power. These narratives of resistance circulate power that roots from a dissent towards certain governing principles or dominant thoughts. It is seen that social order and the disciplinary society is a reproduce of the coercive or ideational forces of the dominating value system or product of class relations. According to Michel Foucault: “Discipline makes individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault, *Reader* 188). Thus, it is a mechanism which seeks to create a system through surveillance, suppression, and supervision ensuring submission to ruling social, political, and juridical ideologies. Althusser also shares a similar view regarding ideology being a reflection of “the interests of the economic dominance of the ruling class” (Ferretter 91), that creates an illusion of freedom, but in reality, subjects think and act in the given ways of the state. Althusser explains: “The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection ...” (Ferretter 91).

To this end, in any given society, power over subjects depending on the economic base or the infrastructure results in class struggle or power struggle. The relation of the subject towards state power is that of resistance, opposition and struggle for attaining freedom from its domination. This desire to be free from established authority gives rise to the alternative system of thoughts which is sought and materialized through an oppositional power structure. In this connection, what Barry Smart in his work *Michel Foucault* (2007), explains about Foucault’s opinion on the relationship of power is useful for the understanding of resistance:

Foucault argued that every relationship of power implies a potential “strategy of struggle”, that is to say the relatively stable mechanisms through which conduct may be guided and outcomes and outcomes ordered in the course of the exercise of power may be displaced by the “free play of antagonistic reactions.” In other words a relationship of power ... [is] a relationship of confrontation by which it may be displaced or undermined. (Smart 134)

Thus, recalcitrance is the basis for social change. The hegemonic process creates confusion and fragmentation of consciousness due to suppression or preclusion of the



possibility of alternative values and world views (see Sallach, “Class Domination and Ideological Hegemony”). Further, the conflicting world views (practical ideas and received ideas) within an individual’s consciousness also produce contradictions called “contradictory consciousness” (Cheal 109-117). David J. Cheal explains: “These dominant values contradict these shaped by the experience of everyday life in the lower classes. The result is a high level of confusion and inconsistency in the political opinions of subordinate groups” (Cheal 109-117). To this extent, though coercive or ideational forces are responsible for social order, these are not immune to resistance and opposition resulting from contradictory consciousness. Detective narratives circulate pleasure through resistance to power structures of hegemonic apparatus, establishing that the strategy to rule and the strategy to contest is indispensable to one another. Narrative pleasure can be seen as distorted mirror image of power, because resistance does not mean negating or terminating power relations. It is an alteration of this relation that acknowledges the existence of a particular type of power. Both the ruling class and the exploited class lives its own ideology, that is,—the former dominates and the latter contests the power of domination reflecting that a ruling power permeates in a given social structure.

In the OAS’s and Jackal’s resistance to De Gaulian power structure, the narrative to some extent opens up prospects of splits and disruption. But the contestatory power is denied complete identification and destruction of the source of hegemonic dominance. Similarly, Jorge of Burgos and the Camerlengo’s oppositional power brings to light the fissures, cracks and limitations of state power and its authorized representatives. Interestingly, the narrative does not acknowledge a reversed situation of power and dominance by allowing construction of a substitute of state power. The term “resistance” in this category of narratives can be defined as an apparatus of contradictory consciousness to subvert state apparatus. In each case, power struggle does not completely obliterate the ideological resonance of either side, despite individual selves being terminated in the process. The ground for an antithetical power struggle within the narratives is the perpetration of crime, symbolizing the resistant group’s/class’s/individual’s challenge to authority, followed by its investigation and detection by representatives of state power. Investigators like Claude Lebel, William of Baskerville and Robert Langdon’s vulnerability to the attacks of power that resists reflect the flaws of the social/political/legal system they represent. But the fact that they are not

physically punished symbolizes the survival of state power, though it is now scathed, exposed and ripped of its earlier invincible image.

Quite interestingly, the Jackal, Jorge of Burgos and the Camerlengo physically perish without surrendering or being defeated in the true sense of the term. But their tactics of operation and managing secrets are never fully exposed, thereby betraying the state's attempt to deface the entire recalcitrant movement. This is explained by what Foucault observes regarding the "existence of resistances by virtue of the strategic field of power relations, but this does not mean that they are 'doomed to perpetual defeat,' rather they constitute an 'irreducible opposite of power relations'" (Smart 133). Further, "both power and resistance are synonymous with sociality; their respective forms may change, but a society without relations of power and therefore forms of resistance is in Foucault's view inconceivable" (Smart 133). To this extent, pleasure production tools in the narratives of resistance can be seen as producing distorted images of power. In other words, the narrative design does not venerate or comply with state ideological apparatus and recalcitrance contributes to its distortion and maiming.

### **1.2.3. Detective Fiction and Literary Subversion**

Referring to yet another category of detective fiction differing from those that sometime appeal for the "legitimate" and sometime for "non-sanctioned" pleasure, select detective narratives written in the twentieth century produce pleasure by looking at an individual's relationship with society following Raymond Williams explanation of an exile and a vagrant. The fact that these texts subsume negotiation of power between the social and antisocial world interprets a purposeless social existence. The narrative does not conform or challenge the established authoritarian power, "rather rejects its purposes and despises its values because of alternative principles to which ... (the) whole ... reality is committed" (Higgins 79). To this extent, such narratives that foreground irrationality and annihilation of power mechanics produce pleasure by creating a world that defies social beliefs and principles of societies. Narratives which question rather than answer and remain suspended instead of presenting concrete ideas, identify and solicit readers for whom power and social formations are terms alienated from their uncondescending individuality.

In this connection, J.L.Borges' "Death and the Compass," "The Garden of Forking Paths" and "Ibn-Hakam Al-Bokhari, murdered in his Labyrinth" can be used as references to define pleasure in this category of detective fiction. In "Death and the Compass," Lonnrot's obsession with the Cabalistic and Talmudic theological queries, Treviranus' practical yet mediocre intelligence responsible for deducing a correct theory of the three murders are worth noticing. Lonnrot's supra-intellectual vision that fails him in his investigation and in preserving his own life, explicates an alternative principle of social order-disorder addressing the desire for annihilation than establishing a regular order. In fact prior to his murder by Red Scharlach, Lonnrot's desire to be killed in his next life in a "labyrinth that consists of a single straight line that is indivisible and endless" (*Compass* 156), interprets textual pleasure outside bounded restrictions like triangles and quadrangles. Interpretation is an open indefinite line that extends at both ends limitlessly, defying any boundary or convention. Thus, the pleasure of interpretation can be described as what Maurice J. Bennett refers to as "the implication that any possible cosmic scheme may be specifically framed not for man's salvation but his annihilation" (Bennett 270).

In "The Garden of Forking Paths," the battle between the "pursuer" Capt. Richard Madden and the "pursued" Dr. Yu Tsun indicate a chaotic universe that transcends into the complex (Forking Path). The narrative intention complements the purposeless existence of Yu Tsun and his preparation for annihilation that arises from his alienation from a social ideal he is forced to follow:

I did not do it for Germany. What do I care for a barbaric country that has forced me to the ignominy of spying? Furthermore, I know of a man of England—a modest man—who in my view is no less a genius than Goethe ... No did it because I sensed that a Leader looked down on the people of my race ... I wanted to prove to him that a yellow man could save his armies. (*Garden* 120-21)

The fact that Yu Tsun manipulates Capt. Madden and gets him arrested for Dr. Albert's Murder points to the exceptional narrative pattern from the regular pattern of authority and control. The narrative apparatus thereby justifies pleasure that circulates with the belief in the alternative principle of social existence. Similarly, the narrative of "Ibn-Hakam Al-Bokhari, Murdered in his Labyrinth" subsumes the prospect of order from chaos since it is a reiterated interpretation of the identities of Al-Bokhari and Sa'id—a

(mis)interpretation of the murderer and the murdered. It can be seen that this narrative of detection circulates pleasure by altering and usurping the universal order and authority that a king commands over his subjects. Textual pleasure does not lie in the desire to achieve a single correct interpretation of the narrative of Al-Bokhari. Rather, it derives from numerous alternative interpretations of the chaotic “complex” that subsumes the possibility of idealized conventions of regularity and harmony.

Detective novels like Paul Auster’s *The New York Trilogy* (1985), Thomas Pynchon’s *The Crying of Lot 49* (1965), and Peter Ackroyd’s *Hawksmoor* (1985), offer narratives where pleasure of the reader is produced by subsuming the established social order and authority. The narrative blurring of the detective and criminal, of the pursuer and pursued, is identical with the desire for blurred strangeness in universal human existence. In other words, these detective texts dissolve the “secret” without either confirming or rejecting it. This technique thereby allows the possibility of a belief in a nihilistic social principle that engulfs within it established forms of power and social formations. This is further defined by Merivale and Sweeney’s definition: “A Metaphysical [Postmodern] detective story is a text that parodies or subverts traditional detective story conventions—such as narrative closure and the detective’s role as surrogate reader—with the intention, or at least the effect, of asking questions about mysteries of being and knowing which transcend the mere machinations of the mystery plots” (see Priestman, *Cambridge Companion* 254). To this end, the detective’s role in a postmodernist detective text—through his gradual effusive existence—does not function as a mediator of conformity between narrative intention and pleasure of perception for dispersion and dissipation in the text. In this sense, pleasure of fiction circulates through the narrative reality of an alternative principle that offers no possibility of decoding the “secret,” rather effaces every scope of authoritarian and social certainty. These narratives foreground a moment of disillusioned truth about the different forms of power structure in a given society in relation to an individual’s uncertain existence within it.

The three narratives of *The New York Trilogy* circulate pleasure through the investigation of secrets that are illusory. The pseudo cases that involve Quinn in “The City of Glass,” Blue in “Ghosts” and the narrator in “The Locked Room” establish the redundancy of surveillance and the strangeness associated with social order in a given society. The fact that Quinn is actually a pseudo detective and operates under the personality of Paul

Auster points to the narrative intention of identifying with the desire for believing in a social power structure that is illusive and self subsumptive. Similarly, in “Ghosts,” pleasure of the text is generated through the questions and doubts regarding the purpose of Blue’s existence and authenticity of Black and White. Interestingly, Black, White and Blue can be seen as one individual, reflecting the divided, confused or oneiric self of the narrator. Hence, pleasure depends on the paranoiac persecution of that which transcends beyond any established social conformity. The distinction between the pursuer and the pursued is very marginal given the narrative uncertainty of surveillance among Blue, Black and White. The Narrative of “The Locked Room” circulates pleasure through the narrator’s quest for the “mysterious” and the “hidden” that ends with subsuming the quest and quested. Narrative intention for an alternative principle develops from his perception of an indefinite and unresolved chaos in the social order. All the three narratives in the trilogy condition pleasure through indeterminate power struggle between the investigator and the so-called offender, thereby turning on the narrator’s self-reflexivity about his own social existence.

*The Crying of Lot 49* as a postmodernist detective text can be explained by a “postmodern modality to “postmodern” life, giving us the feeling that we are watched everywhere ... postmodern writing reflects this feeling of being under the gaze of an anonymous surveillance” (Flieger, “Postmodern Perspective” 87). The protagonist Oedipa’s condition has been described as “she is in the grip of an ineffable conspiracy of global proportions ... from unseen sources” (Flieger 90). Oedipa “seem to be menaced from without, haunted by cryptic characters, at once ubiquitous and maddeningly elusive, sinister shadows” (Flieger 90). Thus, Oedipa turns into a detective out of compulsion in order to satisfy her urge to know about the things happening to her. Her paranoia is rooted in her disbelief and doubt in the social order and harmony, thereby rejecting authority and conditioning narrative pleasure. This situation can be explained by what J.A.Flieger defines about postmodern texts and its narrative design and intention:

Many a postmodern text ... seems to be written in an oneiric, hallucinatory mode, where the fluctuations of desire mold the text, and where there is a slim line between wish-fulfillment, animism, and paranoid projection. In these dreamtexts,

which often slip into paranoid nightmares, the ... [protagonist] too, shares in the ultimate fantasy of persecution, by being absorbed by the tale. (Flieger 94)

Oedipa's doubts and mistrust is the vortex in which the narrative also gets engulfed. Her real and oneiric or psychical world loses all distinction and identifies with her suspicion about order and harmony that is symbolized by authoritative power. Pleasure of the text depends on the experience of vacillation and projective identification with the "paranoid" point of view of the narrative ... the ... [protagonist] too is caught in the collapse or failure of the Symbolic order, beginning to suspect that simple things harbor more significance than the reality they appear to reflect" (Flieger 106).

*Hawksmoor* as a postmodernist detective text offers the images of the protagonist and antagonist merged into one, that symbolize not only the rejection or negation of authoritative power, but also as the production of pleasure from anticipating the transposition of the "real" into the "oneiric." If *Hawksmoor's* England is considered as the "reality," then Dyer's England is the "hallucinatory" or "paranoiac dream. By creating confusion between the two, it creates a dreamlike state: "...the delusional works from within the narrative points of view, engrossing ... in a lurid delirium" (Flieger 106). To this extent, Dyer is seen as *Hawksmoor's* alter-ego, through which the paranoid structure of the narrative doubts the Symbolic order. Therefore, pleasure is pre-conditioned by persecuting the "secret" of the nihilistic textual world. This in turn can be seen as a mirror or projection of the postmodern nihilistic principle subsuming both the pursuer and the pursued, and eventually claiming the unresolved universal chaos.

Detective narratives like *The Crying of Lot 49*, *The New York Trilogy*, and *Hawksmoor*, subsume or subvert authority and social structures of power where there is apparently no confrontation or contest between the social and antisocial. In each case, the investigator is dragged into circumstances where the notion of crime, criminal and power is not confined within parameters of state ideology or hegemonic domination. The conceptions so far used of the "ruling class," "social panopticon," "normativization" and "resistance" lose their relevance from the fact that there is subsumption of any power relation in these texts. The ground for crime and detection prepared by the narratives is surreal or intangible and the problematic of power and authority assume a confused or questionable position. The disbelief or doubt in the age old mechanics of power and authority can be defined by Gramsci's notion of the "wave of materialism" and "crisis of authority." He

explains: “If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e., no longer “leading” but only “dominant”, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci, *Prison* 275-76). Feelings of morbidity, futility, scepticism, cynicism etc. are terms which are synonymous with the understanding of narrative subsumption of hegemonic power structures and its responsibility of social surveillance.

In other words, these are narratives or discourses of unreliable authority which “may be read as consistent with a certain paranoid vision which refutes the accepted authoritative or consensual version of reality” (Flieger 90). The crisis created out of loss of faith in the social order and harmonious existence—depending on a coercive structure of “human schemes” (Bennet)—empowers detective texts with the power of interpretation that is superior and annihilates any other form or conception of human power. Thus, these narratives are narratives of power that perceive human beings and social structure as subjects to the universal cosmos where “man is launched on a ceaseless quest to identify the plot, to decipher the text, to discover the center of the cosmos—or, if he must, to invent them. The identifying human trait [narrative trait] thus becomes metaphysical speculation—‘conjecture’” (Bennet 267). To this end, postmodern detective texts circulate pleasure production tools by way of subsuming power production tools. The mechanics of state power is annihilated to establish that such powers are redundant in its search for social order, given that the concept of order itself is irresolvable. Thus, narrative pleasure can be seen as subverted mirror image of power since subversion and power are interrelated issues.

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