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# List of Acronyms

AS	Autonomous System
AUK-VIII	Auckland Network Trace
BGP	Border Gateway Protocol
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CUSUM	Cumulative Sum
DDM	DDoS Detection and Mitigation
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DNS	Domain Name System
DPM	Deterministic Packet Marking
DRDoS	Distributed Reflection Denial of Service
HCF	Hop Count Filtering
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
LAN	Local Area Network
NTP	Network Time Protocol
OSI	Open Systems Interconnection
PPM	Probabilistic Packet Marking
QoS	Quality of Service
SDN	Software Defined Network
SEM	Source End Marking
SFT	Singleton Flow Traceback
SIP	Source IP
SNTP	Simple Network Time Protocol
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TTL	Time To Live
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
VOIP	Voice Over IP
VSC	Violating Source Count
WAIK-VIII	Waikato Network Trace