

Chapter 1

Clause-Linking in Cognitive Linguistics

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1.0 Introduction

The thesis is carried out within the framework of cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics is an emerging field of study within modern linguistics which Ronald Langacker has been developing since the mid-1970s. The theory has been most comprehensively articulated in Langacker's (1987, 1991) two volumes called *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar Vol I* and *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar Vol II*. Other key figures in the field are George Lakoff, Leonard Talmy, Gilles Fauconnier, and further developed by John R. Taylor, Vyvyan Evans, Malanie Green, Gunter Radden,

Rene Dirven, Marjolijn Verspoor, Mark Turner, Martin Haspelmath, William Croft and many others.

Cognitive linguistics was developed as a conscious reaction to Chomskyan linguistics, which insists that syntax is autonomous and has nothing to do with meaning or cognition. On the other hand, the very basic tenet of cognitive linguistics is that human language forms an integral part of human cognition. Grammar is not independent, rather it is motivated by human perception and conceptualization. In cognitive linguistics, grammar is a way of linguistically expressing our conceptualization of reality. According to Taylor (2002, p. 4), cognitive linguistics aims, therefore, to provide a cognitively plausible account of what it means to know a language, how a language is acquired, and how they are used. That cognitive linguistics is reliant on cognitive notions is apparent from the fact that it makes use of notions like visual perception, mental scanning, perspectiveness, viewing arrangement, figure-ground alignment, etc. in understanding and analyzing linguistic phenomena.

1.2 Clause-linking from a cognitive perspective

Clauses are grammatical representations of real-world events or situations. These events or situations involve things (conceptual counterparts of nouns) and relationships (conceptual counterparts of verbs, adverbs, and adjectives). Things in the world do not exist in isolation. They interact with each other through relationships to form events or situations. An event or situation denotes a process, something that is temporal or grounded in reality. Therefore, a clause essentially represents a situation. However, a sentence can consist of one or more clauses.

Similarly, events or situations in the world do not exist in isolation. They are connected to each other in meaningful ways. Clause-linking is a grammatical method for expressing these connections between events or situations. Based on their meanings, clause-linking can be divided into four main types: juxtaposition, coordination, subordination, and complementation.

Complex situations can be expressed either as juxtaposed clauses (e.g., ‘He came here yesterday. I saw him’) or as complex sentences using coordination (e.g., ‘He came here yesterday and I saw him’) or subordination (e.g., ‘When he came here yesterday, I saw him; ‘I saw him coming here yesterday).

Cognitive linguistics employs the following concepts to explain clause-linking in language: construal, profiling, proximity-distance, sequential order, figure-ground, and perspectiveness.

1.2.1 Construal

Each of these types of clause-linking is based on a particular type of construal. A conceptualizer¹ may conceptualize the same event in multiple ways depending on the conceptualizer's own perception of the situation and may linguistically encode the same situation in alternate ways. This ability of the conceptualizer to construe the same event in alternate ways is called a *construal*. As is described by Radden & Dirven (2007, pp. 21-22): "There is, as a rule, more than one way of thinking of a particular scene and describing it in language. In choosing one conceptual or linguistic alternative rather than another, the speaker construes her thoughts in a specific way. Construals are cognitive operations which are often strikingly similar to principles of visual perception. For example, I may describe the contents of a bottle of whisky as being half full or half empty. In describing it as half full, I am looking at the drink that is (still) left in the bottle, and in describing it as half empty, I am thinking of the drink that is gone. The descriptions clearly differ with respect to the perspective adopted: from the perspective of a full bottle or from the perspective of an empty bottle. Adopting a particular perspective is one of many possible construal operations."

Therefore, we can safely say that the different ways of clause-linking are simply different ways of construing the same situation alternately, depending on the speaker's own conceptualization of the situation. However, the speaker does not choose one construal over another arbitrarily but based on cognitive principles such as proximity-distance, sequential order, and figure-ground.

1.2.1.1 Proximity-Distance

According to this principle, things that belong together conceptually tend to be closely linked in grammar, and vice versa. Thus, for example, similarity, or contrast between two things is one conceptual unit (which might be rather universal) and may, therefore, be

¹A conceptualizer is one who conceptualizes situations of the world and grammatically expresses those situations in language according to their own perspective of the situation.

realized as a juxtaposition in grammar, where two nouns or clauses, as observed, are placed side by side. By way of another example, in our perception, every physical action has a beginning, a development, and an ending, i.e., what is technically called aspect, is an inherent aspect of the meaning of a verb, while time is not. Thus, conceptually, between aspect and time, aspect is closer to an action. Thus, when both tense and aspectual markers are present, the aspectual marker is affixed to the verb, not the tense marker as in ‘Mary was swimming yesterday’, where the aspect marker *-ing* is suffixed to the main verb ‘swim’, and the tense marker *-ed* is away from it to combine with the auxiliary verb ‘be’ in ‘was’.

1.2.1.2 Sequential Order

Two real-world situations (may) happen sequentially in time, i.e. one following the other. This temporal order may be mirrored in the order the clauses describing them, as in ‘He came and left.’ To quote Radden and Dirven (2007, p. 53): “A classic illustration of this principle is Caesar’s famous exclamation *Veni, vidi, vici* ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’, when he described his victory over King Pharnaces II of Pontus. The chronological order of these three events is iconically reflected in the order in which they are uttered or written. A modern version of this principle would be the shopping slogan, Eye it, try it, buy it.”

1.2.1.3 Figure-Ground

The idea of figure-ground was developed in gestalt psychology and first applied in cognitive linguistics by Leonard Talmy. According to the figure-ground principle, human perception automatically segregates any scene in the space into a figure (F) and a ground (G). A figure is an entity that receives utmost prominence in a scene and stands out against the ground, i.e., the part of the scene that is considered the ‘background’. Thus, when we have a spatial scene of a bicycle near a building, for example, we understand the bicycle as the figure, and the building as the ground. Here, the more prominent (i.e., the one we want to focus on), stands as the figure while the other, i.e., which is less prominent, is perceived as the figure’s base and is termed as ground.

The principle of figure-ground also applies to language. Langacker has given the theoretical constructs called ‘landmark’ and ‘trajector’ to mean figure and ground in language. Thus, in the example, ‘Because she had a lot of junk food yesterday, she’s got

an upset stomach’; the first clause acts as the causal ground because of which the situation in the second clause happened. Thus, the first clause is the G (the ground) and the second clause is the F (the figure). F is the one that receives the primary focus while G is the one that receives the secondary focus in a profiled relationship. Therefore, the subject of a sentence is F and the object is G. However, there is another concept called *figure-ground reversal* in perception, which is possible when the two entities segregated as F and G are of equal size and prominence, and therefore their roles as figure and ground may be switched between them (see Radden and Dirven 2007, p. 29).

1.2.2 Profile, profiling, and a profiled relationship

Every grammatical entity evokes some kind of meaning or conceptual base. A profile highlights a particular substructure within its conceptual base. In other words, profiling is what an expression designates. Profiling is an important notion in clause-linking in cognitive linguistics.

In clause-linking, where two or more clauses are involved, the question arises as to which profile will prevail at the composite sentence level. In juxtaposition and coordination, the profiles of all the elements involved prevail at the composite level, co-existing as equal units. However, in case of subordination, the profile of the main clause overrides the profile of the subordinate clause and lends its profile to the composite clausal construction. This is referred to as “conceptual subordination” by Langacker (1991, p. 436).

On the other hand, a profiled relationship is one where two or more participants are involved in a temporal situation. There is a conceptual asymmetry between the participants involved in a profiled relationship. Hence, in the example, ‘Mary killed the tiger’, the subject ‘Mary’ is the primary participant and is the figure (F), and the object ‘the tiger’ is the secondary participant and is the ground (G). Thus, profiling is also a kind of figure-ground relation, where one participant is highlighted against the other.

1.2.3 Perspectiveness

“Perspectiveness relates to the way in which a scene is viewed, including the relative prominence of its participants” (Evans, 2007, p. 162). It is one of the parameters of focal adjustment, which states that attention is differently focused on different aspects of the

same scene based on the conceptualizer's perspective of the scene. The notion of perspectiveness primarily plays an important role in choosing the construal of complementation. Achard (1988, p. 173) suggests that the choice between finite and non-finite complementation is mainly a matter of perspective. The choice of one construal over the other reflects how a particular event is perceived by a particular conceptualizer. The perspective of objectivity is chosen in the case of finite complementation by the speaker when reporting facts and creating a clear separation from the situation expressed. However, the perspective of subjectivity is chosen in the case of non-finite complementation by the speaker when sharing the perspective of someone involved in the situation, creating a shared experience.

Below is an application of the notions of construal, proximity-distance, sequential order, profiling, and perspectiveness to explain the meaning and grammar of clause-linking in cognitive linguistics. Consider the following examples adapted from Radden and Dirven (2007, p. 54), renumbered below as (1) - (5).

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| (1) <i>I saw the bird. It flew away.</i> | [juxtaposition] |
| (2) <i>I saw the bird and it flew away.</i> | [coordination] |
| (3) <i>I saw the bird as it flew away.</i> | [subordination] |
| (4) <i>I saw the bird flying away.</i> | [non-finite complementation] |
| (5) <i>I know that the bird flew away.</i> | [finite complementation] |

In (1), the construal of juxtaposition is chosen because the speaker conceives a weak conceptual link between the two situations involved. Therefore, a weak grammatical linking like juxtaposition is chosen by the speaker to combine such situations. Juxtaposition is mainly chosen when the speaker wishes to show some kind of connection between the situations involved but the connection is conceptually rather weak or purely inferential. Juxtaposition is the weakest form of grammatical linking of clauses in language. Sometimes, the motivation for juxtaposing two clauses next to each other may also be hidden or rest in context or discourse. That is why, juxtaposition is largely inferential as well.

Because of their weak conceptual and grammatical linking, juxtaposed clauses can be interpreted in multiple ways. For example, in (1) above, the two situations - the speaker

seeing the bird and the bird flying away - are two independent situations, distanced in time. Following the principle of iconicity, it can be claimed that in the real world, first the speaker saw the bird, and then the bird flew away. Even though the temporal order in juxtaposition is not explicitly stated, the situations can be interpreted temporally. Under the principle of sequential order, the situation described by the first clause, 'I saw the bird' happened first, followed by the situation described by the second clause, 'the bird flew away.' When the order of the clauses is reversed, the meaning of the whole situation also changes. The bird may fly away on their own accord and may have nothing to do with the speaker seeing it. Or, the whole situation can also be interpreted causally. That is, because the speaker saw the bird, the bird flew away. In other words, the first situation is the cause (G), and the second situation is the effect (F). Situations in juxtaposition can also be interpreted evidentially. That is, the bird flew away, and the speaker knows it for a fact because the speaker has seen it fly away. However, none of these meanings in juxtaposition are tightly explicit. Of the two clauses juxtaposed next to each other in (1), the profile of neither supersedes the other. The profiles of both clauses co-occur as equals at the conceptual level. Meaning, at the conceptual level, (1) designates both the acts of seeing and flying.

However, the speaker chooses the construal of coordination, as in example (2) above, when the conceptual connection between the situations is stronger in the real world. Situations combined through coordination are more tightly connected conceptually and, therefore, are also more tightly connected grammatically. They are linked to each other in a single sentence by a coordinator. These situations are not as distant in time as in juxtaposition. Unlike juxtaposition, they seem to occur or at least begin to occur at the same time or within a short period. This is because the coordinator not only links the clauses but also brings the temporal profiles of the two clauses closer together, making it seem that the two clauses are also temporally closer to each other. That is why clauses in coordination always have a stronger temporal and causal connection than clauses in juxtaposition. Example (2) can be interpreted both temporally and causally. In it, the first clause, 'I saw the bird' is the cause (G), and 'it flew away' is the effect (F). Unlike in juxtaposition, in coordination, it cannot be claimed that the situation of the bird flying away is completely autonomous conceptually and has nothing to do with the speaker seeing it. Here, evidently, the second situation is related to the first situation, and that is why they are connected by the coordinator 'and'. When two clauses are tightly connected,

they will definitely garner some kind of meaning from that connection. The speaker chooses the construal of coordination when they wish to highlight the strong temporal or causal link between the situations involved. (Radden & Dirven, 2007, p. 55). Nevertheless, just like in juxtaposition, if the order of the clauses is reversed, the meaning of the whole sentence changes as well, indicating that these meanings are not very tight or explicit. In coordination as well, the profiles of both clauses co-occur and prevail at the composite sentence level. Thus, (2) above designates both the acts of seeing and flying.

The construal of subordination is chosen when the speaker wants to explicitly highlight the type of connection that exists between the two connected situations, as in (3). Clauses in subordination are much more tightly connected conceptually and, hence, more tightly connected grammatically. They are always linked by a subordinator. Because the connection between the situations involved is already explicitly stated, they cannot have multiple meanings, but only one tight and evident meaning. These meanings can be adverbial (e.g., temporal, causal, concessive, purposive) or relational.

In subordination, the situations can be clearly segregated into figure (F) and ground (G). The situation that stands out as the main piece of information is the main clause or the figure; and the situation that modifies the figure, i.e., the non-prominent information, is the subordinate clause or the ground. In other words, the subordinate clause can be an adverbial clause modifying the main clause or a relative clause modifying the head noun in the main clause. Through the construal of subordination, the speaker aims to communicate which of the two situations is foregrounded (F) and which is backgrounded (G).

In example (3), the subordinate clause ‘as it flew away’ modifies the main clause ‘I saw the bird’ temporally. It does not have any other meaning. The subordinate clause situation acts as the temporal ground upon which the main clause situation (F) happens. The meaning in subordination is so tight that even if the order of the clauses is reversed, the meaning remains the same. At the composite level, the profile of the main clause supersedes the profile of the subordinate clause; thus, (3) above designates the process of seeing and not of flying.

The construal of complementation is chosen when the conceptual link between the connected situations is the tightest, as in (4). Therefore, complementation is the tightest grammatical linking of clauses in language. In complementation, the complement clause situation is no longer understood as a situation in its own right but rather as a conception of reality of the main clause situation's subject. That is why, grammatically as well, the complement clause sits in the position of the main clause object. In the case of non-finite complementation, as in (4) above, the complement clause is so tightly integrated into the main clause that the main clause tense itself grounds the complement clause in reality, it does not have its own tense. It may or may not have a subject of its own. And even when it does, the subject of the non-finite complement clause is always in the accusative, i.e., it is not a typical subject, e.g., 'I heard her singing in the bathroom today.' Note that, the subject of the non-finite complement clause is in the accusative 'her'. Or, it may not have a subject at all as in (4) above. (4) designates the act of seeing and not of flying; therefore, it is safe to say that the profile of the main clause supersedes and lends its own profile to the overall construction.

In (5) as well, the complement clause is understood as an object of conception of reality of the main clause subject, i.e., the speaker. The conceptualization "the bird flew away" exists only within the reality conception of the main clause subject and not outside of it. That is why the construal of complementation is chosen to connect such situations. However, unlike in (4), in (5), the complement clause retains its tense and its subject is, just like any other typical subject, in nominative. That is, it is only subordinate in the sense that the finite complement clause is grammatically marked by a complementizer and conceptually it exists only in the reality of the main conceptualizer i.e., the main clause subject. (5) also designates the act of knowing and not of flying. Meaning, the profile of the subordinate clause is superseded by the profile of the main clause, and the profile of the main clause prevails at the composite sentence level.

In (4) above, the perspective of subjectivity is chosen by the speaker to express a situation she herself is involved in, i.e., she herself has seen the bird lying away. While, in (5), the speaker has chosen the perspective of objectivity as she herself is not directly involved in the action, rather the action, i.e., the complement event 'that the bird flew away' exists only as part of her conception of reality.

1.1.3 The semantics of juxtaposition

Situations in the world are connected only when the combination garners some kind of meaning; they are not connected randomly or arbitrarily. For two situations to be connected in a meaningful way, they must have at least something in common. This is the fundamental idea of juxtaposition and clause-linking in general. Two clauses are juxtaposed next to each other only when they have a meeting point, a common ground, or when the speaker wants to garner some meaning by juxtaposing them next to each other.

In real life as well, we usually do not go on connecting random things. We only keep or coordinate similar things together. One trivial example would be a kitchen, a space in the house where food is prepared. Therefore, items used for cooking and eating, such as utensils, pots and pans, ovens, etc., are typically kept in the kitchen. Toiletries, on the other hand, are not kept in the kitchen.

Perhaps this explains why we link two or more elements grammatically only if they are similar or have something in common to say. In other words, we understand the world around us by coordinating similar things together. The German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege, rightly pointed out that we do not count dissimilar things. That is why a noun like ‘furniture’ cannot be pluralized because it encompasses heterogeneous items, ranging from a dressing table to a bed.

Juxtaposition, in the broadest sense, is used in all areas of life, from literature and poetry to visual art and grammar. Its strength goes beyond the mere act of surface-level linking. In poetry, Juxtaposition is widely used, i.e. the connections are not overtly stated. The reader has to infer for herself the possible connections. The 17th-century Japanese poet Basho's famous *haiku* sets three images side-by-side without any overt link, leaving it to the reader's imaginative inference.

*“Old pond,
leap-splash –
a frog.”²*

² Translated from the Japanese by Lucien Stryk. *On Love and Barley: Haiku of Basho* (1985, p. 58).

One is reminded here also of the renowned opening line of Charles Dickens *A Tale of Two Cities*: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times” (2003, p. 5), where the novelist used juxtaposition. Similarly, oxymorons like “awfully good” and “bittersweet” employ juxtaposition to convey contrasting ideas. Juxtaposition is also sometimes used to add a touch of humor.

Juxtaposition, the most concise way of linking clauses, has proven to be a powerful literary device, allowing authors to create striking and memorable effects. As Shakespeare's *Hamlet* famously observed, “Brevity is the soul of wit” (Act II, Scene II, p. 90). By juxtaposing contrasting elements, writers can deliver their messages with concise and impactful force.

Coming back to grammar, juxtaposition is prevalent in our everyday language use. It is primarily used when the speaker wants to draw some parallel between two situations without explicitly stating it. The speaker then juxtaposes the clauses, placing them one after the other, for the listener to infer from the context. Therefore, discourse and context play a crucial role in juxtaposition.

This also means that clause-linking is not entirely syntactic; it is, on the other hand, constrained by semantics. In juxtaposition, clauses are placed next to each other without any overt linking element, or more simply, a ‘linker’ connecting them. In coordination, the two clauses are always linked by a linker element called a ‘coordinator’. While, in subordination, the two clauses are linked by a ‘subordinator,’ and in complementation, they are linked by a ‘complementizer’.

1.4 The conceptual import of coordination

According to Langacker (2008, p. 409), coordination is the “mental juxtaposition of co-equal elements”. Conceptually, two situations are conceived at the same moment, and these co-conceived situations are grammatically linked using coordinators. However, this coordination is only possible when the two situations share a degree of abstract similarity. Wierzbicka (1980, p. 383) refers to this common ground between coordinated clauses as a ‘common denominator.’ Consequently, sentence (6) below is acceptable, while sentence (7) is not.

(6) *John went to the market, and Mary went to the Church.*

(7) (!) *I went to the market, and the cow is a four-footed domestic animal.*

In the sentence ‘John went to the market and Mary went to the Church,’ two clauses are connected by the coordinator ‘and.’ These clauses are conceptually juxtaposed and behave *in* parallel with other elements within the larger structure (i.e. both went somewhere: one to the market, the other to the Church, in the example). In the words of Langacker, “[the coordinated elements] represent a general concept and have parallel relationships with other parts of the sentence.” (2009, p. 349) Schematization is the process of recognizing similarities among different experiences (e.g., ‘Paul danced and Mary sang; John wrote and Mary read’) to create a more abstract idea (i.e., to do something similar in parallel by two people: dancing/singing, reading/writing). Thus, coordinated clauses should be at least conceptually similar to allow for a higher level of abstraction based on their shared features.




Fig. 1: Conceptual import of coordination (adapted from Langacker, 2009, p. 350)

In Fig. 1, *X* and *Y* represent two coordinated clauses in example (6) that are linked by the coordinator ‘and’. These clauses are co-conceived, that is, mentally juxtaposed, and they behave in parallel with other elements within the larger structure. The outer box, *Z*, represents the larger structural configuration, while the smaller boxes contain *X* and *Y* which behave in parallel with other elements within the larger structure and together represent a schema or a shared pattern.

Therefore, the coordination schema involves two or more elements typically presented as equal or parallel in importance. They are structurally similar and joined by a coordinator (e.g., *and*, *but*, *or*). We call this schema ***Parallelism Schema***.

The most common coordinators in English are ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and ‘but,’ along with their equivalents in other languages. Correlative coordinators like ‘both/and,’ ‘not only/but also,’ ‘either/or,’ ‘neither/nor,’ and ‘whether/or’ are pairs of words that function together but are separated within a sentence. The coordinator’s inherent meaning specifies the type of relationship between the situations they connect. There are three primary types of coordination: (a) combinative, (b) disjunctive, and (c) adversative. Beyond the main semantic differences, these types can be further distinguished by various nuances.

1.4.1 Combinative coordination

The coordinator ‘and’ is the most typical combinative coordinator in English. We have explained the coordination schema and its instantiation above with the help of ‘and.’ In Fig. 2 below, we have cited a different example of coordination coordinated by ‘and,’ i.e., (8) ‘John and Mary are friends.’

(8) *John and Mary are friends.*




Fig. 2: *and*-type coordination (adapted from Langacker, 2009, p. 350)

It is to be noted that while in the case of (6), John and Mary fill the role individually (i.e., the roles of going to the market and going to the Church), in (8), they fill the role of being friends dually or together. Thus, while in Fig. 1, they are inside two separate boxes (i.e., *X* and *Y*), in Fig. 2, they are inside one single box representing both *X* and *Y*.

1.4.2 Disjunctive coordination

The coordinator ‘or’ is semantically more complex than ‘and’. While ‘and’ primarily indicates a combination or addition, ‘or’ suggests a choice or alternative. It implies that only one of the coordinated elements can be true or valid at a given time.

Or-type coordination involves two mental spaces: Target Space: This is the final outcome where only one of the options will be realized. Immediate Space: This is a temporary space where both options are considered simultaneously, before one is chosen for the target space.

In the immediate space, the alternatives are equally considered and mentally juxtaposed. However, in the target space, only one can occupy the role. Therefore, ‘or’ not only combines elements like ‘and’ but also introduces the notion of alternation. This makes disjunctive coordination, using ‘or’ more complex than combinative coordination, which uses ‘and’.

Thus, Langacker, argues that the coordinator ‘and’ doesn’t possess a distinct, independent meaning of its own. Langacker’s perspective on the coordinator ‘and’ is that it doesn’t carry an independent semantic meaning. Instead, its function is to signal a connection between two elements, indicating that they are to be considered together. The meaning of the connection signaled by ‘and’ is primarily derived from the context and the nature of the elements being joined. For instance, ‘apples and oranges’ suggest a comparison or contrast, while ‘bread and butter’ implies a complementary relationship. In essence, Langacker argues that the meaning of ‘and’ is not inherent but is shaped by the specific context in which it is used. It is a tool for connecting concepts, and its contribution to the overall meaning lies in its ability to establish a relationship between them. (see Langacker, 2009, p. 353)

In Fig. 3 below, we have presented an example of disjunctive coordination by ‘or’ i.e., (9) ‘I will go to the park or to the cinema.’ The additional box in the right denotes the target situation, which will be filled up by either *X* or *Y*. Or-type coordination can be designated as termed *non-factual coordination*.

(9) *I will go to the park or to the cinema.*




Fig. 3: or-type coordination (adapted from Langacker, 2009, p. 350)

1.4.3 Adversative coordination

Adversative coordination is a type of coordination that involves a semantic contrast between two clauses. Unlike combinative coordination, which simply combines two elements without implying a relationship between them, adversative coordination suggests a counter-expectation or opposition between the two clauses.

While both combinative and adversative coordination involve a single mental space, adversative coordination introduces an additional semantic layer. The second clause is presented as unexpected or contrary to what might be anticipated based on the first clause. For example, the phrase ‘old but gold’ suggests that something, despite its age, is still valuable or desirable. This contradicts the common expectation that old things might be outdated or less valuable. The second element, ‘gold’ runs counter to the expectation implied by the first element, ‘old’.

Due to this semantic contrast, the two clauses in adversative coordination are not entirely interdependent. While they are connected by the coordinating conjunction ‘but,’ the second clause carries a specific meaning that is distinct from the first. The overall meaning of the sentence is influenced by the contrast between the two clauses. Fig. 4 below presents the conceptual import of adversative coordination by ‘but’ in (10) ‘He invited me, but I did not go.’

(10) *He invited me but I did not go.*




Fig. 4: *but*-type coordination (adapted from Langacker, 2009, p. 350)

Given this, full equivalence or symmetry in coordination can never be achieved in practice (see Langacker 2008, p. 411). While it is possible to coordinate as many clauses as needed using combinative and disjunctive coordination, adversative coordination is inherently binary. It can only coordinate two clauses at a time and cannot be extended to more than two elements.

1.5 The conceptual import of subordination

Profiling is an important notion in the semantics and grammar of clause-linking and more so in subordination. In Langacker’s words (1991, p. 436), “A subordinate clause is describable as one whose profile is overridden by that of the main clause.”

Unlike in coordination where the clauses share a somewhat symmetrical relationship, the clauses in subordination share an asymmetrical relationship. The subordinate clause and

the main clause do not share an equal status or an equal function. Rather the subordinate clause is dependent on the main clause for its form and meaning. Subordinate clauses are mainly of three types: adverbial clauses, relative clauses, and complement clauses. An adverbial clause behaves similarly to a non-clausal adverb in that it qualifies the main clause for factors like time, condition, cause, reason, purpose, etc. Relative clauses, on the other hand, qualify the head noun in the main clause. That is, although clausal in form, their behavior is quite similar to adjectives as they modify the head noun in the sentence. Traditionally, adverbial clauses and relative clauses are called adjuncts i.e. an additional piece of information to the main clause. A complement clause is called a complement to the main clause, i.e., a vital part of the main clause. It sits in the subject or the object position of the main clause and completes its sense. A complement clause is part of the main argument of the main clause and hence, the name ‘complement clause’.

This perceived symmetry vs. asymmetry in coordination vs. subordination can be explained in terms of profiling. Juxtaposition and coordination are types of clause-linking that represent the case of multiple, co-equal profiles. While subordination only profiles either clause to the exclusion of the other. That is, the profile of the main clause overrides the profile of the subordinate clause and lends its own profile to the whole sentence. Consider the following examples (11)-(15) below:

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| (11) <i>I love to eat and to shop.</i> | [coordination] |
| (12) <i>John was late as he was shopping in the mall.</i> | [adverbial subordination] |
| (13) <i>The handbag that I bought yesterday is lost.</i> | [relative subordination] |
| (14) <i>I know that he loves to shop.</i> | [finite complementation] |
| (15) <i>I quit smoking a long time ago.</i> | [non-finite complementation] |

Example (11) above is a coordinate construction that profiles both its coordinated clauses as two equal profiles, i.e. none is subordinate to the other. The sentence is both about the speaker’s love for eating and his love for shopping. Example (12) is a subordinate structure, where the profile of the main clause overrides the profile of the subordinate clause ‘as he was shopping in the mall’. That is, example (12) designates the fact that John was late for something and not the reason why he was late. On the other hand, in example (13), the profile of the relative clause ‘that I bought yesterday’ is overridden even at the level of the subject nominal. ‘The handbag that I bought yesterday’ designates

the handbag, not when it was bought. Similarly, examples (14) and (15) above, designate the act of knowing in (14) and quitting in (15), respectively, i.e., the profile of the main clause overrides the profile of that of the complement clause.

Another important dimension in subordination is the figure-ground³ alignment which reflects the perceived asymmetry in subordination, i.e., the distinction between the primary and the secondary focus in a profiled relationship.

In the adverbial subordination example in (12) above, the main clause ‘John was late’ is primary, while ‘as he was shopping in the mall’ is secondary, for the connecting relationship expressed by the subordinator ‘as.’ Even if it is argued that profiles of both the clauses exist co-equally at the composite sentence level just like in a coordinate construction, still it is clear that shopping in the mall is the causal ground for the figure getting late.

The subordination involves two situations, where one situation is conceptually subordinate to the other. Therefore, one clause is grammatically subordinated to the other using subordinators, like, ‘as’, ‘because’, ‘when’, ‘while’, ‘if’, etc.

Adverbial Subordination Schema (ASS) involves a mental schema where one clause (i.e., the subordinate clause) provides contextual information about the main clause. This information can relate to time, place, reason, condition or other such circumstances. The subordinate clause is perceived as a backdrop against which the main event unfolds. It is like a stage setting that provides the context for the main action.

While it might be argued that both clauses have equal prominence at the sentence level, it is clear that the subordinate clause provides the context or reason for the main clause. This asymmetrical relationship is a fundamental characteristic of adverbial subordination. Fig. 5 below presents the conceptual import of adverbial subordination by ‘as’ in (16) ‘I could not go as I was ill.’

³ Langacker uses the terms trajector-landmark alignment in place of figure-ground alignment. Langacker (2008, p. 365) suggests that the subject and object relations are grammatical manifestations of trajector/landmark: a subject is a nominal that codes the trajector of a profiled relationship and an object is one that codes the landmark.

(16) *I could not go as I was ill.*




Fig. 5: The conceptual import of adverbial subordination (adapted from Langacker, 2009, p. 329)

Figure 5 illustrates the hierarchical relationship between the main clause and the subordinate clause. The larger box labeled *Z* represents the entire sentence. In the top-most level, *X* represents the main clause and *Y* the subordinate clause inside *Z*, the whole sentence. These clauses are connected by the subordinator ‘as’ inside the subordinate clause *Y*.

When considering the entire sentence, *X* serves as the figure (F), hence in bold and the box representing it is smaller in size, while *Y* is the ground (G), is in un-bold and the box

representing it is bigger in size as the ground is always bigger than the figure⁴. The figure-ground relationship is further elaborated in the lower level. The arrow inside *X* and *Y* denotes that the two clauses, are processual, i.e., tensed. The dotted lines connecting the boxes signify the instantiation of the subordination schema, as well as the elaboration of the internal structure of the clauses involved.

In the lower level, the subordinate clause is elaborated further. The bigger box represents the whole subordinate clause *Y*. Inside *Y* is the subordinator ‘as’ the figure (F) and hence is in bold, while ‘I was ill’ is the ground (G).

Nevertheless, as seen in adversative coordination, where two clauses may exhibit some asymmetry, subordination can also involve a degree of symmetry between the subordinate clause and the main clause. There may be constructions where the information in both clauses is equally important or the information in the subordinate clause is more important than the information in the main clause.

That is, adverbial and relative clauses, too, may add essential meaning, contributing significantly to the overall semantics of the main clause. In (17) below, each clause is conceptually embedded within its preceding clause. That is, each clause is subordinate to the preceding clause as it is conceptually dependent on it. Despite being grounded and specified, they are subordinate in the sense that they serve as the ground for the figure of the main clause. Each clause is conceptually subordinate to its preceding clause as it functions as its ground.

(17) *Mary knows that John believes that God exists.*

(18) *I said it because I meant it.* (example adopted from Langacker, 2007, p. 415)

(19) *You look as if you have seen a ghost.*

(20) *She will come, I suppose.*

⁴ Note that the Ground is typically larger than the Figure, hence a larger box for the subordinate clause. Additionally, bold and non-bold fonts are used to differentiate between finite and non-finite clauses, as well as between Ground and Figure. On the other hand, the dotted lines connecting the boxes signify the instantiation of the subordination schema, as well as the elaboration of the internal structure of the clauses involved. (The described convention applies to all relevant diagrams presented in the current work).

According to Langacker (2007, p. 415), the asymmetry between the main clause and the subordinate clause is less apparent in causal adverbial clauses like (18) than in other complex sentences. It appears that the content of both clauses is equally important and equally focused.

Diessel (2013, pp. 341-354) has correctly observed that subordinate clauses in discourse often contain content that is more important than the content of the main clause. In a manner adverbial clause like (19), for example, the content of the manner clause seems more important than the content of the main clause. Furthermore, the main clause with an adverbial clause of manner is not semantically complete. When we say ‘you look’ as in (19), the question ‘how do you look?’ immediately arises.

Manner Subordination Schema (MSS) involves a mental schema where one clause (i.e., the subordinate clause) describes the way in which the main clause action is performed. The subordinate clause provides a detail picture of the action, making it more vivid and concrete. It is much like a close-up view of the specific details of the action.

In (20), it is clear that the main clause ‘I suppose’ is only an afterthought, an extra piece of information added to the finite complement clause ‘she will come.’ The complement clause is dependent on the main clause as it is conceptually embedded within it. However, it is quite evident that the information in the complement clause is more important than the information in the main clause.

Therefore, instead of a strict dichotomy, we must strive for a more flexible system with fuzzy boundaries between categories. A truly unitary nature of linguistic categories seems unlikely. It is not achievable to provide a single classification encompassing the vast area of multiclausal constructions.

Coming to **relative subordination**, the profile of the relative clause is overridden, even at the nominal level. The head noun, which the relative clause modifies, plays dual roles: It is the figure (F) in the main clause (the head noun is the primary focus of the main clause); it is the figure (F) in the relative clause (the head noun is the focus in the relative clause).

Relative Subordination Schema (RSS) involves a mental schema where one clause (i.e., the subordinate clause) modifies a noun in the main clause. It provides a close-up view of a particular aspect of the noun. Thus, the subordinate clause provides additional information about the noun, helping to identify or describe it more precisely.

In the example ‘The bag that I bought yesterday is lost,’ the head noun ‘the bag’ has two roles: it is the figure (F) in the relative clause ‘that I bought yesterday,’ and it is the figure (F) in the main clause ‘is lost.’ Fig. 6 below represents the conceptual import of the relative subordination by ‘that’ in (21) ‘The bag that I bought yesterday is lost.’

(21) *The bag that I bought yesterday is lost.*




Fig. 6: The conceptual import of a relative clause (diagram adapted from Langacker, 2007, p. 424)

Figure 6 illustrates the hierarchical relationship between the main clause and the relative clause. The topmost box represents the entire sentence Z. Inside Z the left-most box

represents the relative clause, the right-most box represents the main clause. Both of them have the arrow symbol to mean that they are processual in nature. The middle box inside Z represents the head noun ‘the bag.’ It is in bold, as it serves as the figure (F) of both the main clause and the subordinate clause. That is, it has two roles: ‘the bag’ is the figure (F) to the main clause ‘is lost,’ (G); ‘the bag’ is the figure (F) to the relative clause ‘that I bought yesterday,’ (G).

The lower level further elaborates the relative clause, ‘that I bought yesterday.’ Here, the relativizer ‘that’ is the figure (F) (hence in bold and is represented by smaller box), while the relative clause is the ground (G), represented by the bigger un-bold box.

1.6 The conceptual import of complementation

As previously discussed, in complementation, the profile of the main clause overrides the profile of the complement clause. (14) and (15) above is re-numbered below as (22) and (23). In (22), ‘that he loves to shop’ is the ground (G) to the figure (F) ‘I know’ whose profile dominates at the sentential level. In other words, (22) is primarily concerned about the act of knowing, not the act of shopping.

Similarly, in (23), ‘smoking a long time ago’ functions as the ground (G) to the figure (F) ‘I quit.’ This implies that the sentence primarily focuses on the act of quitting, rather than the act of smoking. The linkage between these clauses stems from complementary schema, wherein one situation is conceptually a complement to the other. That is, the complement clause serves as an object to the main clause and helps complete its sense. This is called **Complementary Schema (CS)**. Fig. 7 that follows, presents the conceptual import of complementation with the finite complementizer ‘that’ in (22) ‘I know that he loves to shop.’

(22) *I know that he loves to shop.*

(23) *I quit smoking a long time ago.*




Fig. 7: The conceptual import of complementation (diagram adapted from Langacker, 2007, p. 330)

Figure 7 illustrates the hierarchical relationship between the main clause and the complement clause. The larger box labeled *Z* represents the entire sentence. *X* represents the main clause and serves as the Figure (F), while *Y* represents the complement clause and functions as the Ground (G). The arrow inside *X* and *Y* indicates that both are tensed clauses.

The lower boxes provide a more detailed breakdown of the complement clause structure. It highlights the complement clause, with the complementizer ‘that’ acting as the Figure (F), while ‘he loves to shop’ as the ground (G).

Fig. 8 that follows, presents the conceptual import of complementation with the non-finite complementizer ‘-ing’ in (22) ‘I quit smoking a long time ago.’




Fig. 8: The conceptual import of complementation (diagram adapted from Langacker, 2007, p. 330)

Fig. 8 illustrates the hierarchical relationship between the main clause and the complement clause. The larger box labeled *Z* represents the entire sentence. Within this, the larger box *Y* represents the non-finite complement clause, functioning as the Ground (G). The smaller, bolded box *X* represents the main clause, the Figure (F). The arrow within *X* indicates its processual nature as a tensed clause, i.e., the main finite clause. Dotted lines between the boxes indicate the instantiation of the subordination schema, as well as the elaboration of the internal structure of the clauses involved.

At the lower level, the complement clause *Y* is further analyzed. The larger box within *Y* represents the Ground of the complement clause, and the smaller, bolded box within it represents the Figure (F), the subordinator *-ing*.

Regardless of the notion of profiling, the asymmetrical relationship between the complement clause and the main clause is apparent. The complement clause occupies the position of the main clause object, effectively functioning as its participant. In examples (22) and (23), the verbs ‘know’ and ‘quit’ act as space-builders, creating conceptual spaces filled by the respective complement clauses, ‘that he loves to shop’ and ‘smoking a long time ago.’ Even if one argues that the profiles of both clauses are manifested at the composite level, the layering of the complement clause within the space created by the main clause demonstrates its inherent conceptual asymmetry.

1.6.1 Vantage point and viewing arrangement

When choosing the construal of complementation, two crucial notions are involved: (a) vantage point and (b) viewing arrangement, which are collectively referred to as perspectiveness⁵. A conceptualizer conceptualizes a world event from their own vantage point. The same event can be conceptualized differently by various conceptualizers depending on their individual vantage points.

The main conceptualizer of the complement event is C1. C0 is the speaker who expresses C1’s conception of reality, which is represented by CL2. CL2 is the complement clause, and S2 is the subordinate clause subject. When C1 conceptualizes CL2 subjectively, the construal of non-finite complementation is chosen. Conversely, when CL2 is construed objectively by C1, as a distant conception of reality, the construal of finite complementation is selected. This relative position of C1 and CL2 is referred to as a viewing arrangement.

When the event is conceptualized objectively, there exists an asymmetry between C1 and S2. This is known as the “Optimal Viewing Arrangement” (OVA). (See Figure 9 that follows) In finite complementation, all the elements of the complement clause, including its subject S2, are onstage and viewed objectively by C1. C1 is considered to be construed with maximal subjectivity, while CL2 is construed with maximal objectivity. This arrangement maximizes the asymmetry between C1 and S2 (the subordinate subject), as

⁵ The conceptualizer’s relation to the scene conceptualized is metaphorically considered in terms of perception. (Langacker, 1985, 1990).

they are respectively treated as the subject and object of conceptualization. (See Achard, 1988, pp. 187-190)




Fig. 9: The viewing arrangement of Finite complementation: OVA (adopted from Achard, 1988, p. 188)

When CL2 is conceptualized subjectively, the asymmetry between C1 and S2 becomes somewhat blurred. This is called the 'Egocentric Viewing Arrangement' (EVA). (See Figure 10 below).

In the case of non-finite complementation, there is a blurring of the asymmetry between C1 and S2 (See Fig. 10 below). S2 is not viewed as an object of conceptualization but rather as the point from which CL2 is conceptualized. In other words, C1 conceptualizes CL2 (the complement clause) from the vantage point of S2. This is possible because the main clause subject C1 and S2 are coreferential.




Fig. 10: The viewing arrangement of non-finite complementation: EVA (adopted from Achard, 1988, p. 189)

1.7 No clear-cut boundaries

While we have identified four major types of clause-linking, the boundaries between them are not always rigid. Cognitive linguistics emphasizes the transitional nature of linguistic categories, suggesting that there may be intermediate categories sharing characteristics of two or more categories. This approach is in contrast to the idea of sharp boundaries between linguistic categories. As Langacker (1987, p. 18) states, “[Another] dimension of the discreteness issue concerns the propriety of positing sharp distinctions between certain broad classes of linguistic phenomena, thereby implying that the classes are fundamentally different in character and in large measure separately describable. The nondiscrete alternative regards these classes as grading into one another along various parameters. They form a continuous spectrum (or field) of possibilities, whose segregation into distinct blocks is necessarily artifactual.”

Therefore, it would be inaccurate to claim that clear-cut boundaries exist between these four major clause-linking types. Instead, these types likely exist as a continuum with fuzzy boundaries, as evidenced throughout this thesis. Langacker (1991, p. 419) rightly points out that it would be erroneous to assume that “any single classification could accommodate the diversity of multiclausal constructions together with the many kinds and degrees of similarity displayed by overlapping subgroups.”